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ABSTRACT
Vicarious liability in the franchising context is a
fundamental issue, both in the United States and foreign
jurisdictions. With no all-encompassing, clear precedent in the
United States, other nations'approaches may provide lessons for
American lawmakers and the U.S. franchising community.
Together, the division between jurisdictions and the absence of
uniform standardsfor imposing vicariousliability on franchisors
demonstrate the need for more comprehensible and predictable
case law. This need can be met through an examination of
European regulations, model laws, and guidelines, as well as the
laws in a number of nations worldwide, which indicate a
pathway to better franchise agreements and possible
governmental mandates (e.g., prominent, required notices about
a franchise's business ownership). Franchisors would have in
hand the means to determine their risks andplan their behavior,
even accounting for the more effective approaches to franchisor
vicarious liability that are sometimes found elsewhere in the
global franchisingcommunity.

* J.D., Harvard Law School. Huber Hurst Professor of Business Law, Univ. of
Florida, robert.emerson@warrington.ufl.edu.

245

246

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

[VOL. 50:245

LAW

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.

II.
III.

......................................
INTRODUCTION
THE CURRENT STATE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN
THE UNITED STATES..................................
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO VICARIOUS

...........................................

LIABILITY

A.

Contributionsto FranchiseLaw:
MultinationalApproaches.......

............

246
250

255

256

1. Rome I Regulations and Conflict

256

of Laws................................
2. UNIDROIT's Contribution to
International Franchise Law
and Vicarious Liability Concepts ...........

271

1. The European Union
.....................
2. France
................................

272
273

3. Italy

277

4. Germany

5. China ..
IV.

260

..............................

B. Model Nations

..................................
...............................

279

...............................

6. Australia and New Zealand .....
....................................
CONCLUSION.

...........

281
285
290

I. INTRODUCTION

Franchising is one of the most popular methods for running and
expanding a business. In the United States, there are approximately
760,000 operating franchised units,' accounting for one-third of all
retail sales, 2 over 8.2 million directly employed persons, 3 another 10
million indirectly related jobs, 4 and over $2 trillion in annual retail

1.
IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, FRANCHISE BUSINESS EcoNoMIC OUTLOOK: MAY 2013
3 (May 31, 2013), http://emarket.franchise.org/FranchiseBusinessOutlookMay.pdf
[perma.cc/NE3Q-PHSX (archived Jan. 28, 2017).
2.
This has long been franchising's rough percentage of the total retail economy,
since at least the year 2001. ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS
OF FRANCHISING 26-27 n.28 (2005). For earlier statistics, see LAVERNE L. LUDDEN,
FRANCHISE OPPORTUNITIES HANDBOOK v (1995); Robert W. Emerson, Franchising
Covenants Against Competition, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 n.4 (1995) (citing
numerous sources concerning the rapid growth of franchising in both the 1980s and the
early 1990s).
3.
LUDDEN, supranote 2, at v.
4.
Id.; FranchiseBusinesses Produce SignificantImpact on U.S. Economy, INT'L
FRANCHISE ASS'N, http://www.buildingopportunity.com/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2016)
[https://perma.cclLW2W-BDJF] (archived Jan. 28, 2017); INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE
ASSOCIATION, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FRANCHISED BUSINESSES, VOLUME II:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS 6-7, 11-12 (2008), http://www.franchise.org/
uploadedFiles/Franchisors/OtherContent/economicimpact documents/EconImpactV
ol2_HiLights.pdf [hereinafter NEC, The Economic Impact] [https://perma.ccA82Q-
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sales. 5 Furthermore, the American concept of franchising is expanding
rapidly throughout the world, accounting for an ever-growing share of
international commerce. 6 Collectively, these businesses have accrued
hundreds of billions of dollars in annual sales. 7 This trend towards
franchising means that the need for regulations in the franchise sphere
is more important than ever. In response, more and more governments
have decided to police those who choose to franchise with franchisespecific legislation; such legislation has already been integrated into
over thirty nations' legal regimes. 8 This worldwide rise in domestic
regulation will no doubt continue.
Overall, worldwide franchising, even more so than franchising in
the United States, has experienced a high rate of growth in recent
years. 9 As an example, Germany, a country where the first McDonald's

SNB9] (archived Jan. 28, 2017) (stating that franchising--directly or indirectlyaccounted for over 20 million jobs, representing an expanding proportion, over 15 percent,
of the total private-sector workforce). Of course, while the number of direct employees was
as high as 11 million in 2005, it certainly fell some during the economic downturn of
2008-10. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 198
n.30 (2010) (citing employment statistics at just over 9.5 million employees as of 2009).
5..
As of 2006, franchising generated an overall output of $1.53 trillion. Small
Company Trends in 2007, THE TRIB. (Dec. 31, 2006), http://www.greeleytrib.com/
article/20061231[BUSINESS/112310347 [https://perma.cc/N96R-TLJ7] (archived Jan.
28, 2017). More current U.S. estimates are: 3,000 different franchisors in over 300
different business categories; more than 900,000 businesses (about one in 12 of total
businesses) are franchised, and they generate almost 18 million jobs as well as over $2.1
trillion of economic output, including approximately 50 percent of all retail sales. See
Quick Franchise Facts -

Franchising Industry

Statistics, AZFRANCHISES.COM,

(last visited Aug. 25, 2016)
http://www.azfranchises.com/quick-franchise-facts/
[https://perma.ce/CM4F-RMAW] (archived Jan. 28, 2017) (stating that franchises have
generated over $2 trillion to the economy).
6.
See Emerson, supra note 4, at 196-97 n.23 (detailing the numerous statistics
indicating the phenomenal growth of franchising worldwide, both throughout Europe and
such diverse and important national economies as those of Australia, Brazil, China, India,
and Japan).
7.

See MAN. LAW REFORM COMM'N, Event Summary: Franchise Symposium

-

&

Material Consultation Paper on Franchising Legislation, 8 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus.
TRADE L. 181, 187 (2008) (reporting that according to a study conducted in 2001, "more
than 767,000 franchised businesses directly employ[ed] 9.8 million people, with a payroll
of $229 billion and an economic output of nearly $625 billion"; also noting that
franchising in 2001 accounted for 11 percent of the private sector payroll and 9.5 percent
of the private sector economic output - more than $1.53 trillion).
8.
See Executive Summary of Franchise Laws Around the World, DLA PIPER
(2008), http://files.dlapiper.com/files/upload/Summary%20on%20Intl%20Franchise.pdf
[https://perma.ccl93R4-8QZD] (archived Jan. 28, 2017) (summarizing the laws of the 33
nations that specifically govern franchising); see also Laws Applicable to Franchising,
DLA PIPER (2008), http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/Map%20Franchise%20
Laws%20Global%20FINAL%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/47NC-NTK3] (archived Jan. 28,
2017) (map showing the spread of franchising-specific legislation across the globe
thirty-three nations, including six in the Americas, fifteen in Europe (seven European
Union Nations and eight non-EU countries), and eight in East or Southeast Asia).
9.
See Emerson, supra note 4, at 196-97 n.24 (detailing the numerous statistics
indicating the phenomenal growth of franchising worldwide). In the United States,
franchised businesses operated over 800,000 establishments in 2016, including
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opened in 1971,10 saw a 50.79 percent increase in franchisors, an 83.87
percent increase in franchisees, and a 40.62 percent growth in
franchises from 1998 to 2008.11 Similarly, China, a country that only
recently opened its doors to the global market, has enjoyed steady
growth in franchising, reaching over 1 million franchise shops by
2011.12

As franchises have increased in international popularity, crucial
legal issues have emerged concerning basic jurisdictional matters, such
as conflicts of law, fundamental contract interpretation disputes-or
even exclusion of clauses in the franchise agreement-and the
franchisor's potential vicarious liability for its franchisee's tortious
actions. The contract and tort issues arise, in part, from a tenet of
franchise ownership and management: franchisees are not completely
free to run the business as they see fit. Besides government regulation
of businesses generally, the franchisee is subject to the rules imposed
by the franchisor in the parties' agreement or in ancillary documents
(e.g., the operations manual).1 3
This Article concerns vicarious liability in the franchising context,
as addressed in a number of foreign jurisdictions. As there is a lack of
clear precedent in the United States, these foreign approaches may
provide lessons for American lawmakers and the U.S. franchising
community. 14 The lack of uniform standards for imposing vicarious

franchisees and franchisor-owned establishments. In 2016, franchised businesses
directly provided nearly nine million jobs, met a $351 billion payroll, produced $868
billion of output and added over $541 billion of gross domestic product. IFA FRANCHISE
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FOUNDATION (HIS MARKET ECONOMICS), THE ECONOMIC

IMPACT OF FRANCHISED BUSINESSES: VOLUME IV (2016), http://franchise.org/sites/
default/files/FranchiseBusinessOutlookJan_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP33-SFB4]
(archived Mar. 16, 2017).
10.
A BriefHistory of McDonald's, MCSPOTLIGHT, http://www.mcspotlight.org/
company/company.history.html (last visited July 11, 2013) [https://perma.cc/BEE6DKAY] (archived Jan. 28, 2017).
11.

DEUTSCHER FRANCHISE

VERBAND,

FRANCHISE-FAKTEN

2010

4

(2010),

https://www.rheinhessen.ihk24.delblob/mzihk24/starthilfe/downloads/1450396/a9112a23d93
5eb37775837d3afd21eb4/FranchiseFakten_2010-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQN4-QQ4V]
(archived Feb. 11, 2017).
12.
Ella S.K. Cheong, China, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING CHN/1 (Dennis
Campbell ed., 2nd ed., 2016); see also Robert W. Emerson, Franchiseesas Consumers:
The South African Example, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 455, 464 n.55 (2014) (detailing the
large and growing presence of franchising in South Africa as well as in the even bigger,
more established Australian, Chinese, French, and U.S. economies). By 2016, China's
top 100 franchises generated total sales in 2016 equating to $66 billion. U.S. INT'L TRADE
ADMIN., DEPT. OF COM., 2016 TOP MARKETS REPORT: FRANCHISING 19 (2016), http://www.

trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/FranchisingTopMarkets Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZMH7S9SY] (archived Mar. 16, 2017). China has over 4,500 franchises, more than even in the
United States. Id.
13.
See Schlotzsky's, Inc. v. Hyde, 538 S.E.2d 561, 562 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(stating that the franchisee has full and complete control of the day to day operation
except as set forth explicitly in agreements with the franchisor).
14.
Compare Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Wis. 2004)
(demonstrating the majority approach to franchisor vicarious liability, which assumes
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liability on franchisors has undermined the ability of parties to a
franchise agreement to evaluate the risks of entering into the
relationship and better plan their subsequent behavior. This
demonstrates the need for more understandable and predictable case
law.
This Article also analyzes the variance in the national franchise
legislation of foreign countries. Typically, courts in these various
nations will analyze a franchisor's potential vicarious liability based on
domestic legal systems. 15 For example, in civil law countries, such as
France and Italy, the analysis relies heavily on the consumer's
reasonable expectation as to the ownership and control of the
franchise.' 6 In contrast, in common law countries, such as the United
States and Australia, the analysis turns on the extent of the control
that a franchisor has over its franchisees. 1 Despite the lack of uniform
standards in both U.S. and international franchising communities,
vicarious liability in general has three core requirements: First, there
must be a legally sufficient relationship existing between the person
causing the plaintiffs injury and the vicariously liable defendant.' 8
Second, the person must act wrongfully in causing the plaintiffs
injury.' 9 Third, the tortious act must have occurred within the scope of
the relationship between the tortfeasor and the vicariously liable
defendant.2 0 The first core element of vicarious liability, the legally
sufficient relationship, has been the source of much of the confusion in
establishing a consistent blueprint in franchising law. Courts in
countries that follow common law traditions have a problem defining
the level of control needed to establish a relationship's legal sufficiency.

that an independent agency relationship exists between the franchisor and franchisee
and focuses on the question of whether the franchisor had sufficient control over the
proximate cause of harm to make it vicariously liable), with Myers v. Garfield & Johnson
Enters., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 598, 617 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (demonstrating the minority
approach and holding that the franchisor was potentially liable under three different
theories: (1) directly as a "joint employer" with franchisee; (2) vicariously as franchisee's
actual principal under an agency relationship; and (3) vicariously as plaintiffs
"ostensible" employer).
15.

GREGG RUBENSTEIN ET AL., VICARIOUS AND OTHER FRANCHISOR LIABILITY,

26 (2011), http://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/ek-pdfs/htmlpage
vicariousliability(1l)O.pdf [http://perma.cclHP8B-BLPK] (archived Jan. 28, 2017).
Id.
16.
17.
Id.
18.
Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisorsfor the
Torts of Their Franchisees, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 424 (2005); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (2006). To this kind of claim some courts have answered that
the plaintiff did not rely on the franchisor's care, at least with respect to the injuries
suffered in the particular case, although others have denied the apparent-agency claim
on the ground that a franchisor does not hold out the franchisee as an agent merely by
licensing the trademark to him. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN, & ELLEN M.
BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 433 (2012) (explaining what makes a relationship legally
sufficient in the vicarious liability context).
19.
King, supra note 18.
20.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07 (2006).
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This Article examines franchisor vicarious liability in several foreign
jurisdictions in an attempt to reduce the confusion surrounding
franchisor vicarious liability in the United States.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE UNITED
STATES

In the United States, the legally sufficient relationship
requirement can be met either by establishing the presence of an
actual, sufficient relationship (i.e., an actual agency relationship) or by
satisfying one of the exceptions to the relationship requirement (e.g.,
the apparent agency exception, which is the most important exception
in determining franchisor vicarious liability). 21 Thus, courts have
identified two basic agency law theories for holding a franchisor
vicariously liable: establishing either the actual or the apparent
authority of the franchisee to render its franchisor liable for its
conduct. 22 These concepts are based on traditional common law and
have been applied to tort, statutory, and contract claims, as well as to
the franchise relationship. 23
A franchisor "may be held liable for acts of his franchisee when
the actual relationship between them is that of principal and agent or
master and servant."2 4 Through this actual agency principle, a
franchisor, like any other principal, is responsible for the acts or
omissions of a franchisee that is, in fact, operating as the franchisor's
agent.2 5 The traditional approach for determining whether an
economic relationship will be legally sufficient to support this
application of vicarious liability is the control test, 26 which derives from
the language of the Restatement (Second) of Agency: a servant is one
"who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right to control."27 There are
ten factors considered when applying the control test.28 While most

21.
See generally Heather Carson Perkins et al., FranchisorLiability for Acts of
the Franchisee, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 174, 176 (2010) (noting that "the law on vicarious
liability appears to be trending toward and analysis of whether the franchisor controlled
the instrumentality that caused the harm").
22.
DAVID A. BEYER, VIcARIOuS LIABILITY (2013), http://www.franchise.org/sites/
default/files/ek-pdfsfhtmlpage/VICARIOUS-LIABILITY-_David-BeyerO.pdf
[http://perma.cclA24T-4N6L] (archived Jan. 28, 2017); see THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY
W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 40-41 (2009) (discussing how the issue of the right to control in a franchise
context determines whether a franchisor has opened itself up to liability under either
actual or apparent agency).
23.
HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 22, at 41.
24.
King, supra note 18, at 429.
25.
BEYER, supranote 22, at 5.
26.
King, supra note 18, at 430.
27.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
28.
Id.; see, e.g., Jones v. Filer, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (W.D. Ark. 1999)
(applying the ten factors). The Jones court expounded:
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franchise agreements explicitly assert that the parties are independent
contractors and disclaim any agency relationship,29 the terms of "the
contract will not be dispositive and the courts will review the true
nature of the relationship in making its decision."3 0 The courts will
and
the underlying
manuals
consider operations
typically
circumstances in assessing whether an actual agency relationship
exists.3 1
In taking this holistic approach to actual agency, courts commonly
require that the control of the franchisor relate to the day-to-day
operations of the franchisee in order to establish vicarious liability. 32
Courts additionally distinguish control intended primarily to ensure
the "uniformity and the standardization of products and services" of
the franchisee from control over the "actual day-to-day work"-the
33
majority of courts adopt this "daily operations" control test.
Moreover, many of these courts have required not only that the
franchisor's control encompass day-to-day operations but also that the
franchisor's control extend to the instrumentality for the injury at
34
issue.

In deciding whether a given individual or entity is an agent or an independent
contractor, the Arkansas courts have considered the ten factors found in § 220 of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency: (a) the extent of control which, by
agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or
not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind
of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the
skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the
workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the
person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not
the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the
parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j)
whether the principal is or is not in business.
Id.
See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise ContractInterpretation:A Two-Standard
29.
Approach, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 641, 697 (2013) (a survey of 100 U.S. franchise
agreements in 2013 found 74 percent had a provision stating that the franchisee is an
independent contractor and not an agent, although this is down from 91 percent of the
franchise agreements for a comparable survey in 1993).
BEYER, supra note 22, at 5; see, e.g., In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., 662
30.
F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1085 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (citing Brown v. Who's Three, Inc., 457 S.E.2d
186, 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)) (stating that the contractual characterization is not
controlling and the fact finder may look beyond the terms of the contract).
See FedEx, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 1085 (providing examples of other materials a
31.
fact finder may look at when determining whether an actual agency relationship exists).
King, supra note 18, at 431.
32.
Id. at 432.
33.
Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 338-41 (finding ten cases where courts adopted this
34.
narrower "instrumentality" causing the harm prerequisite for franchisor vicarious
liability, rather than the broader standard of control generally regardless of whether
related to the actual cause of harm); see RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15 (detailing the
current majority approach to franchisor vicarious liability adopting the basic agency
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A recent case exemplifying this approach is Pattersonv. Domino's
Pizza, LLC, 35 in which a franchisee's employee claimed that she was
sexually harassed by a coworker, and that both she and the harasser
were actually employees of Domino's, the franchisor. In a four-to-three
holding that relied heavily on the terms of the franchise agreement,
the California Supreme Court reinstated summary judgment for
Domino's. The court declared that "[a] franchisor will be liable if it has
retained or assumed the right of general control over the relevant dayto-day operations at its franchised locations ... and cannot escape
liability in such a case merely because it failed or declined to establish
a policy with regard to that particular conduct." 36 Rejecting the appeals
court's more expansive interpretation of vicarious liability, the
California Supreme Court stated that the "imposition and enforcement
of a uniform marketing and operational plan cannot automatically
saddle the franchisor with responsibility for employees of the
franchisee who injure each other on the job."3 7 Thus, the court decided
against possible franchisor vicarious liability for a franchisee-hired
worker's alleged statutory or common law violations. Furthermore, the
court concluded that "the mere fact that the franchisor has reserved
the right to require or suggest uniform workplace standards intended
to protect its brand and the quality of customer service at its franchised
locations is not, standing alone, sufficient to impose 'employer' or
'principal' liability."3 8
There are some notable U.S. cases finding franchisor liability
based on the franchisor's status either as the franchisees' employer3 9
or as the joint employer (with its franchisees) of the franchise's

standard that considers the franchisor's control or right of control over the
instrumentality that is alleged to have caused the harm).
35.
Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 725 (Cal. 2014).
36.
Id. at 743.
37.
Id. at 726.
38.
Id. at 739 n.21.
39.
See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 84-85 (D. Mass.
2010) (finding an employer-employee relationship between a janitorial services
franchisor and its franchisees); see generally Robert W. Emerson, Assessing Awuah v.
Coverall North America, Inc.: The Franchiseeas a Dependent Contractor, 19 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 203 (2014) (examining Awuah, the franchise business model, franchising
disclosure standards and legal requirements, and the limitations of agency and contract
law in addressing problems unique to franchising; noting that franchisees are often
prone to cognitive errors and psychological biases leaving them ill-equipped to make
sound investment decisions, and concluding that franchisees need additional protections,
including the right to form associations and enter into collective bargaining agreements
with the franchisor).
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workers. 40 Still, those holdings are a distinct minority. 41 The best
established ground for finding franchisor vicarious liability is the more
generalized interpretation of control explained above. While still
leading to fewer pro-liability than no-liability decisions, this approach
presents the most obvious, direct basis for expanding franchisors'
potential vicarious liability. 42 This is because the actual authority on

behalf of franchisors arises simply from the franchisor's overall control
over the daily operations, nothing more specific. 43
To compound the confusion generated by the courts' inconsistent
approaches to establishing actual agency, there are several generally
recognized exceptions to the actual agency requirement, the most
prevalent being apparent agency. 44 Through the apparent agency
exception, a franchisor may be liable for its franchisee's actions if
"apparent" agency can be established, even if the franchisee is not the
franchisor's actual agent, and even if the franchisor has not retained
significant control over the franchised business.

45

There are two aspects of franchising that make the apparent
agency doctrine especially germane: (1) because franchisors own and
operate some of their own retail units and franchise others, the
consuming public is often unsure as to which one the principal
company owns and operates and which ones it franchises; and (2) the
trademark, uniformity, and standardization inherent in the brand
name product or service precipitates the belief that the retail unit
selling that product or service is operated by the principal company

40.
Browning-Ferris Industries of Cal., 362 N.L.R.B. 186 (2015) (holding that
two entities- in effect, the franchisor and franchisee-are joint employers of, say, a
franchised unit's employees if a franchisor has reserved authority to control the essential
terms and conditions of that employment-setting wages and hours, the number of
employees, the scheduling, manner, and type of work, and operating instructions- even
if this power of the franchisor is not exercised and the actual control of employment
matters is communicated to workers through the franchisee).
See Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 331-32 ("[T]he marketing, quality and operational
41.
standards commonly found in franchise agreements are insufficient to establish the close
supervisory control or right of control necessary to demonstrate the existence of a
master/servant relationship for all purposes or as a general matter."); Gray v.
McDonald's, USA 874 F.Supp. 2d 743, 750 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) ("[T]he undisputed
evidence establishes that McDonald's and [its franchisee] are not so interrelated that
they may be considered a single employer or an integrated enterprise.").
See Rainey v. Langen, 998 A.2d 342, 349 (Me. 2010) (holding, in a case
42.
involving Domino's, that "[w]e conclude that the traditional approach strikes an
appropriate balance and, for that reason, decline to adopt the instrumentality rule").
Rainey is one of the last cases to withstand the shift in emphasis from general to specific
operational control.
King, supra note 18, at 436. This is distinct from Kerl, in which the court
43.
assumed the franchisor-franchisee relationship is a principal-agent relationship, with
the liability question simply being whether the franchisor had sufficient control over the
proximate cause of harm to make the franchisor vicariously liable for the franchisee's
actions. 682 N.W.2d at 332.
King, supranote 18, at 438.
44.
45.
BEYER, supra note 22, at 7-8; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §267 (1958).
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rather than run as an independently owned and operated franchise. 46
This lack of public knowledge about the relationship between the
franchising parties has led courts to deem franchisee use of the
franchisor's trade name as grounds for finding apparent authority. 47
As a result of these two realities, the apparent agency doctrine is the
theory that poses the greatest risk of vicarious liability for
franchisors. 48

Apparent agency exists if a franchisor, through its action or
inaction, induces an innocent third party to reasonably conclude that
the franchisee is the franchisor's agent or that the third party is
dealing with the franchisor.4 9 Thus, the third party must prove three
elements to establish apparent agency: (1) a representation by the
principal, (2) reliance on the representation by a third person, and (3)
a change of position or damage suffered by the third person.so Claims
of apparent agency can be overcome by adequate notice of independent
ownership-that is, notice of the franchisee's separate identity and the
independent ownership placed on signage, brochures, business cards,
menus, checks, purchase orders, contracts, and advertising.51 For
additional protection, the franchisor can expressly disavow
responsibility for employment and other franchisee matters in the

46.
King, supra note 18, at 439; see generally, Jonathan E. Schulz, You Can't
Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: The Standards for EstablishingApparent Agency, 60
S.C. L. REV. 999 (2009).
47.

Takenari Shimizu, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, supra note 12,

at JAP/1, JAP/-10 (rejecting the franchisor's argument that it is common knowledge that
major car dealers are franchisees and that franchisors are generally separate entities
from franchisees). Corporate and franchise law specialist Shimizu refers to a Kobe,

Japan district court case (the Yupos Case, in the Amagasaki Division) holding a car
dealership franchisor vicariously liable to a third party for a franchisee's act. The court
in Yupos denied the franchisor's argument that the third party knew or should have
known it was not dealing with the franchisor since it is common knowledge that car
dealers tend to be franchisees and that franchisors are generally separate entities from
franchisees. Id. at JAP/9. The court considered the franchisee's use of the franchisor's
trade name to be sufficient for apparent authority even though: (1) the trade name,
address or indication of representative status were not depicted on the sales agreement
or purchase price receipt; (2) the third party had previously dealt with the franchisee;
(3) on business cards, the franchisee's name was larger than the franchisor's trade name;
and (4) a released commercial television film mentioned the franchisor's solicitation of
prospective franchisees. Id. at JAP/10.
48.
See generally, Schulz, supra note 46.
49.
BEYER, supranote 22, at 8; see Allen v. Greenville Hotel Partner, Inc., 409 F.
Supp. 2d 672, 680 (D.S.C. 2006) (explaining that "even if there is no actual agency, a
party may be liable as the principal for another if that principal holds the other out in a
way that reasonably induces reliance on the appearance of an agency relationship").
50.
BEYER, supra note 22, at 8.
51.
Id. at 9; Wyatt Maxwell & Jess A. Dance, NLRB FreshiiMemo Offers Lessons
to Franchisors on Minimising Employment Liability, LEXOLOGY (June 16, 2015)
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c7beebla-1ffc-44a6-a767-160f0754bdb3
[https://perma.cc/6X2V-RQKF] (archived Jan. 28, 2017) (referring, inter alia, to
franchisors' prevention of possible apparent authority by "announc[ing the] independent
relationship to [the] general public through conspicuous signage").
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franchise agreement or operations handbook and avoid exerting
control over personnel policies, such as hiring, scheduling, firing, and
disciplining. 5 2
As with actual agency decisions, cases involving attempts by
plaintiffs to hold franchisors vicariously liable based on apparent
agency have produced a whirlwind of confusing outcomes.53 Since most
franchises are regional, and quite often national operations with
locations in multiple states, this jurisdictional disarray can result in a
franchisor receiving different outcomes for the same behavior solely
because of where the franchisee is located. For example, a court in one
jurisdiction may find that the franchisor has adequate control over the
franchisee in order to establish vicarious liability, while a court in a
different jurisdiction may come to the opposite conclusion even though
the behavior was based on the same level of control.5 4 Such differential
treatment demonstrates the need for more understandable and
predictable case law.55 Given the rapid growth in franchising and its
central role in the world economy, the lack of clarity, predictability,
and analytical integrity in the law governing the vicarious liability of
6
franchisors is unsettling.5
III. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO VICARIOus LIABILITY
Although, on the whole, franchising has increased dramatically
throughout the world in recent years,5 7 each country that has chosen
to regulate franchising through legislation has made its own
regulatory mark. Often, a country's approach to regulation stems from
the country's civil law or common law heritage.5 8 Other nations are
heavily influenced by collective agreements.5 9 Below is a discussion of
the organizations and agreements that have contributed to the
creation of international franchise laws, followed by a discussion of how
various countries have implemented their own regulations.

Maxwell & Dance, supra note 51.
52.
53.
King, supra note 18, at 439-40 (noting that the outcomes of cases addressing
apparent agency are fairly evenly divided and often turn on the issue of reliance); see
Randall K. Hanson, The Franchising Dilemma Continues: Update on Franchisor
Liability for Wrongful Acts by Local Franchisees,20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 91, 100-05 (1997)
(discussing several cases with differing rationales on apparent agency).
See generally King, supra note 18, 465 ("The legal principles governing the
54.
vicarious liability of franchisors are nothing if not unpredictable and inconsistent.").
55.
The inference that a jurisdictional division demonstrates the need for
predictable case law may be considered intuitive, but there is support for that proposition
in the commentary and cases. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
King, supra note 18, at 484.
56.
See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
57.
See infra notes 296-302 and accompanying text.
58.
See infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
59.
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A. Contributionsto FranchiseLaw: MultinationalApproaches
1. Rome I Regulations and Conflict of Laws
As more businesses began to undertake international contractual
obligations, the conflict of laws steadily increased.60 Initially, the
applicable law in the absence of choice was determined by the Rome
Convention 1980 (RC). 61 Specifically, Article 4 of the RC determined
whose law would apply to settle a disputed franchise contract. 62 Article
4.1 provides that "[t]he contract shall be governed by the law of the
country with which it is most closely connected .

. . ."63

Further, Article

4.2 states that "[i]t shall be presumed that the contract is most closely
connected with the country where the party who is to effect the
performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of
conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence . . . ."64
Attempting to determine whose law should apply was especially
difficult under the RC. 65 While Article 4.1 established that the country
with the closest connection should prevail, Article 4.2 also recognized
that the law of the party who held the "characteristic performance"
should rule. 66 Thus, the question became whether the franchisor or
franchisee was the party "who [wa]s to effect the performance which is
characteristic of the contract . . . ."67
Experts and the case law were divided on this pivotal question.68
Initially, the franchisor was found to be the party required to effectuate

60.
See 10 PAUL VOLKEN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (2009).

& ANDREA

BONOMI,

YEARBOOK

OF

PRIVATE

61.
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, Belg.Den.-Ger.-Fr.-Ir.-It.-Lux.-Neth.-U.K, Jun. 19, 1980, O.J. C. 027, 34-46 (1998), http://eurlex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:41998A0126(02):EN:HTML
[hereinafter Rome Convention] [https://perma.cclWN99-M9WJ] (archived Jan. 28, 2017).
62.
VOLKEN & BONOMI, supra note 60, at 202.
63.
Rome Convention, supra note 61, at art. 4.1. Artiicle 4.1 does continue with
this caveat: "Nevertheless, a separable part of the contract which has a closer connection
with another country may by way of exception be governed by the law of that other
country." Id. This exception is elaborated upon in Article 4.3 of the 2008 European
regulation known as Rome I. Infra note 87.
64.
Rome Convention, supranote 61, at art. 4.2.
65.
See Laura Garcia Gutibrrez, Franchise Contractsand the Rome IRegulation
on the Law Applicable to International Contracts, in 10 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 60, at 233, 234.
66.
Gutibrrez further notes that "this problem was not confined to franchise
contracts, but rather was common to all contracts lacking the exchange-ofgoods/services-for-money structure." Id.; see also The Rome Convention: The Contracting
Parties'Choice, 1 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 127, 144 (2000) (discussing the application of the
"characteristic performance" test).
67.
Case C-133/08, Intercontainer Interfrigo SC (ICF) v. Balkenende Oosthuizen
BV, (2009) http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=77859
&mode=req&pagelndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang-EN&cid=56056
[https://perma.cc/7XRW-ARWQ] (archived on Jan. 29, 2017) (alteration in original).
Gutibrrez, supra note 65, at 235.
68.
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the characteristic performance of the contract. 69 Many argued that it
was the franchisor who was required to undertake multiple
obligations, who was the true foundation of the contract, and who was
required to deal with a large number of complex contractual
situations.7 0 Under this theory, in the event of a conflict, and in the
absence of choice, the law of the franchisor's country would be
applied.7 1
Other experts argued, however, that the franchisee was the party
required to carry out the characteristic performance of the contract.7 2
Essentially, these commentators compared franchise contracts to
distribution contracts and noted that, because "several [c]ourt
decisions had deemed the obligations of the distributor to be the
characteristic performance" under distribution contracts, the
franchisee would be the party undertaking the characteristic
performance under a franchise contract.7 3 In one distribution case, a
Swiss court held that, because the party bringing about the
characteristic performance would be the distributor, the franchisee is
the party that effects the characteristic performance. 74
Still other experts argued for a more holistic approach.7 5 These
experts believed that, because it appeared impossible to determine
which party effected the characteristic performance of a contract, the
"law most closely connected with the contract should be applied on a
case-by-case basis."7 6 In light of the continuing conflict, a compromise

was achieved in the form of a European regulation.77
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union
ratified Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 (Rome I), governing the law

69.

Id.

70.
Id.
The notion that the franchisor was the party affecting the characteristic
71.
performance also found precedent in Switzerland's Federal Code on Private
International Law, which addressed conflicts of law for intellectual property contracts
but had an influential effect on the drafting of the Rome Convention. Id. at 243 n.7.
Id. at 235.
72.
Id. at 235-36 (alteration in original).
73.
74.

Rudolph Meroni, Switzerland, in THE INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE OPTION

295-96 (Mark Abell ed., 1990) (citing an unreported case); see also Guti6rrez, supra note
65, at 236 n.9; Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] May 15, 1962, 88
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 169, 170 (Switz.);
[BGer] Aug. 8, 1962, 88 [BGE] II 325, 328 ; [BGer] Dec. 3, 1962, 88 [BGE] II 471, 474.
But see [BGer] Feb. 12, 1952, 78 [BGE] II 74, 81. (discussing characteristic obligations
in distribution contracts). These cases are all about exclusive distribution relationships
and can be found at Einfache Suche in Bundesgerichtsentscheiden, BUNDESGERICHT,
http://www.bger.chlindex/juridiction/jurisdiction-inherit-template/jurisdiction-recht
/jurisdiction-recht-leitentscheidel954.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
H4TC-MGDA] (archived Feb. 11, 2017).
75.
Gutidrrez, supra note 65, at 236.
Id.
76.
See FRANCO FERRARI & STEFAN LEIBLE, ROME I REGULATION: THE LAW
77.
APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS IN EUROPE 41 (2009).
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applicable to contractual obligations, in June 2008.78 The purpose of
Rome I is to regulate civil and commercial obligations, including
franchising, in the event of a conflict of laws. 7 Unlike the RC,8 0 Rome
I specifically mentions "franchises" on two occasions, first in Recital 17

and again in Article

4.81

The significance of Recital 17 is that it classifies franchise
contracts-and distribution contracts generally-as "contracts for
service." 82 Recital 17 also establishes that these contracts "are the
subject of specific rules."8 3 This regulation is still unclear, however,
and this classification of franchise contracts has remained a point of
contention among the many experts seeking to determine (a) which
specific rules, under Recital 17, franchises are subject to, and (b)
whether the classification is in specific reference to Rome I's later
discussion of franchises in Article 4(e). 84
The second mention of "franchise" within Rome I is in Article 4(e),
which specifies the applicable law for franchise contract actions where
no applicable law has been chosen by the parties.8 5 Article 4 states
that, "[t]o the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not
been chosen . . . a franchise contract shall be governed by the law of the
country where the franchisee has his habitual residence." 86 Thus, in
the event of a conflict of laws, the law that the designated court will
apply is the law of the country of residence of the principal actor
carrying out the contract: the franchisee.8 7
The rationale behind the European Community's (EC) regulation,
opting to position the franchisee as the party effecting the

Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
78.
of 17 June 2008 of the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2008 O.J. (L 177), 6
[hereinafter Rome 1]. Rome I replaced the Rome Convention, which established uniform
rules for determining the law applicable to contractual obligations in the European
Union (EU). Rome I went into effect on December 17, 2009. See id. at art. 29.
79.
See id. at art. 1.
See generally Rome Convention, supra note 61.
80.
See Rome I, supra note 78, at rec. (17), art. 4.1(e).
81.
82.
See id.
83.
Gutierrez notes that the definition of a franchise contract as a service
contract is not necessarily accurate. However, such a definition appears appropriate in
light of the skirmish that ensued under the Rome Convention. See Guti6rrez, supra note
65, at 237 (noting that defining a franchise contract as a service contract comports with
answering the question, "specifically, where would the service be provided in a franchise
contract?").
This classification of franchise contracts is highly controversial, as it would
84.
affect not only provisions on applicable law, but also those on international jurisdiction.
See id. at 236.
See Rome I, supra note 78, at art. 4.1(e).
85.
86.
Id. at art. 4.1-.1(a).
See id. at art. 4.. However, Article 4.3 also notes "where it is clear from all
87.
the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with
a country other than that indicated... the law of that other country shall apply." Id. at
art. 4. Thus, Article 4.1(e) would give way to Article 4.3 if necessary. See id. at art. 4.3.
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characteristic performance of the contract, is twofold.88 First, the
franchisee has commonly been viewed as the weaker party to the
contract,8 9 and, therefore, in need of greater protection.o And second,
by allowing the laws of the franchisee's habitual residence to govern
the contract in the absence of choice of law, the law "[takes] into
account the legal order of the State where the franchise is operated as
the market affected by the contract."9 1 In combining these two goals,
the EC has increased the predictability of the law applicable to
franchise contracts. 92
Despite the contentiousness of Article 4(e)'s definition of
franchisee as the party effecting the characteristic performance, the
inquiry for determining which party effects that performance is well
settled.93 Many commentators prefer the RC's finding that the
characteristic

performance

is

effected by the franchisor. 94 Still,

regardless of whether the franchisor or franchisee is the party who
effects the characteristic performance, commentators agree that
answering this question depends on the level of integration of the
franchisee's business into the franchisor's business, and Rome I
recognizes that the franchisee's freedom from or dependency on the
franchisor can vary substantially.9 5 As discussed later, while not

88.
See Gutidrrez, supra note 65. These are the opinions of Guti6rrez and not the
official rationale given expressly by the EC.
89.
The proposal itself implicitly states that franchisees are the weaker party
and thus are deserving of protection under the regulation. Commission Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to
contractualobligations (Rome I), 11 1 9 COM (2005) 650 Final (Dec. 15, 2005), http://eurlex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0650:FIN:EN:PDF (last
visited Aug. 25, 2016) [https://perma.cc/M4WU-SAFA] (archived Jan. 22, 2017)
[hereinafter Proposalfor Rome 1] ("As regards contracts concluded with parties regarded
as being weaker, those parties should be protected by conflict rules that are more
favourable to their interests than the general rules.").
90.
Guti6rrez, supranote 65, at 238.
91.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations removed) (discussing
Proposalfor Rome I, supra note 89).
VOLKEN & BONOMI, supra note 60 (noting that the determination of the party
92.
required to effect the characteristic performance and the identification of a characteristic
performance in franchise contracts is exceedingly uncertain and controversial).
93.
Gutikrrez supranote 65, at 243.
Such commentators include Professor Guti6rrez, who notes that this is
94.
because the franchisor is the party responsible "for the most complex obligations." See
id. at 243.
FERRARI & LIEBLE, supranote 77, at 41. However, this is the settled answer
95.
to the conflict of law question in the EC, and it should be noted that countries such as
China and Australia have different resolutions to conflict of law questions. In China,
courts and judges alike are unsure of whether national or local regulations should apply
to resolve conflict of law questions. See Michele Lee, FranchisingIn China: Legal
Challenges When First Entering The Chinese Market, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 949, 984
(2004). Ultimately, it is crucial to note that "in the absence of franchise-specific
legislation, the relationship between the franchisee and franchisor is governed
[exclusively] by the [explicit] terms of the franchise agreement and the law of contract."
Tamara Milenkovic Kerkovic, The Main Directions in Comparative Franchising
Regulation - UnidroitInitiative and its Influence, 13 EUR. RES. STUD. J. 110 (2010).
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nearly as transparent as the European regulation, it seems that both
China and Australia have taken this approach.96
Ultimately, while Rome I was initially heralded as the opportunity
to convert the 1980 Rome Convention into a European Community
instrument by transforming and modernizing its provisions,
commentators remain disappointed in the end result.9 7 The rules of
Rome I work well in the case of consumers and employees, but they
disappoint in regard to presumptively weak parties, such as
franchisees, due to their lack of bargaining power and generally lower
amount of financial freedom.9 8 Even so, commentators agree that it is
preferable to have rules insulating weaker parties in most cases, even
if those rules do not work well, rather than not having any such rules.99
2. UNIDROIT's Contribution to International Franchise Law and
Vicarious Liability Concepts
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) is an independent intergovernmental organization of
sixty-three Member States and was instituted to "study needs and
methods for modernizing, harmonizing and coordinating private and,
in particular, commercial law as between States and groups of
States."1 00 The principles set forth by UNIDROIT essentially serve as
nonbinding general principles and rules and are largely conditional on
the states' willingness to adopt them.101 The Preamble to the
UNIDROIT principles stipulates that the principles "shall be applied
when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by
them."1 02
UNIDROIT was first founded as part of the League of Nations in
1926.103 Following the collapse of the League, UNIDROIT was
reestablished in 1940.104 It was not until 1985, however, that uniform

96.
Interview with Andrew Terry, Professor of Business Regulation, Univ. of
Sydney Bus. Sch. (May 15, 2015) (on file with author).
97.
See, e.g., Francisco J. Garcinmartin Alf6rez, The Rome I Regulation:Much
ado about nothing? 2008 EuR. LEGAL F. 1 (2008).
98.

CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 549 (K.

Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2010).
See id. at 549-50.
99.
100.
See History and Overview, INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIV. L.
(2009), http://www.unidroit.org/about-unidroit/overview
[hereinafter UNIDROIT]
[https://perma.cclLE44-JKVR] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
101.
Id.
102.

UNIDROIT,

UNIDROIT

PRINCIPLES

OF

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

CONTRACTS (2010), http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles20O0/
integralversionprinciples20lO-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NKS-XXNW] (archived Jan. 29,
2017).

103.
104.

See UNIDROIT, supranote 100.
Id.
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rules for franchising were proposed.1 05 At this time, franchising was
not a common concept in Europe, and North America was one of the
only locales that had adopted the franchising concept. 10 6 Initially,
franchisors' representatives opposed the ratification of any uniform
international franchise regulations,10 7 thus, no rules were adopted at
the time, but UNIDROIT continued to monitor the international
franchise situation.10 8
By 1993, however, interest in international franchising had grown
tremendously,10 9 and the Governing Council of UNIDROIT established
the Study Group on Franchising, which ultimately produced two
documents: the Model Franchise Disclosure Law, submitted to the
Governing Council on September 25, 2002,110 and the Guide to
InternationalMasterFranchiseArrangements,"' initially published in
February 1998 and republished in 2007.112 These documents
demonstrated a pro-commerce, pro-franchising orientation.11 3 Indeed,
much of U.S.-franchisor expansion overseas is accomplished through a
special, robust business format: master franchising. 114 In the master

105.
See MAN. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 7, at 237. In fact, it was a
Canadian member of the Governing Council who proposed to the organization there
should be a uniform set of rules to govern franchise contracts. Id.

106.
See id.
107.
See id.
108.
See id.
109.
This new interest "was largely due to the increased attention devoted to
franchising by legislators and the consequent proliferation of franchise laws, not all of
which had, in the view of the members of the Study Group, given sufficient consideration
to the specific nature and characteristic of franchising, thereby unintentionally putting
the future development of franchising in the country concerned at risk." Id. (quoting
UNIDROIT, MODEL FRANCHISE DISCLOSURE LAW (2002), http://www.unidroit.org/
(last visited Aug. 26, 2016)
english/modellaws/2002franchise/2002modellaw-e.pdf
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Model Franchise Disclosure Law (2002)] [https://perma.cc/DZ9VS9FA] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
110.
See UNIDROIT, supranote 100, at Achievements.
111.

UNIDROIT, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL MASTER FRANCHISE ARRANGEMENTS

(1998).
112.

UNIDROIT, GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL MASTER FRANCHISE ARRANGEMENTS

(2d ed. 2007), http://www.unidroit.orglenglish/guides/2007franchising/franchising2007guide-2nd-e.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Master Franchise Guide (2007)]
[https://perma.cc/29LZ-2DRN] (archived Jan. 20, 2017).
UNIDROIT notes, "[t]he Model Law is intended to encourage the
113.
development of franchising as a vehicle for conducting business. As a pro-commerce
document, it recognizes that franchising offers the potential of increased economic
development, especially among countries seeking access to know-how." UNIDROIT
Model Franchise Disclosure Law (2002), supra note 109, at 10. The franchisor's
development of and continuing provision of savoir faire (know-how) throughout the life
of the franchise is a fundamental element of franchising in practice worldwide, and it is
a legal requirement in most countries, especially civil law jurisdictions. Robert W.
Emerson, Franchise Savoir Faire, 90 TUL. L. REV. 589, 589 (2016).
114.

PETER D. HOLT & AMIR KREMAR, THE BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL MASTER

FRANCHISING, http://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/ek-pdfs/htmLpage/Sun-IntlSummit-Track-1-Basics-Intl-Master-Fran_0.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) [https://
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franchise model, the franchisor grants the master franchisee (also
called a sub-franchisor) the right to franchise to individual unit
franchisees." 5 In effect, the franchisor has no local employees because
there is no direct relationship between the franchisor and the
individual unit franchisees that contracted with the sub-franchisor.
For example, the franchisor may grant twenty restaurant franchises to
the sub-franchisor, who will then in turn contract those twenty
restaurants out to unit franchisees. Under this model, the franchisor
provides the business model and training to the sub-franchisor, who
then provides the capital and human resources to grow the
franchises. 11 6
Because the franchisor does not have a direct relationship with
the individual unit franchisees, the franchisor ordinarily will not be
vicariously liable for any claims against the unit franchisee, the subfranchisor, or the sub-franchisee.1 17 While not being liable for claims
is an advantage of this hands-off approach, there are disadvantages,
including the fact that the franchisor does not have as much control
over its franchised units as it would in a normal franchise
relationship." 8 In master-franchise arrangements there are
essentially two agreements made: an international agreement between
the franchisor and the sub-franchisor (the master franchise
agreement), and a domestic franchise agreement between the subfranchisor and the sub-franchisee (the sub-franchise agreement)." 9

perma.cc/PY2M-8ARE] (archived Jan. 20, 2017) (80 percent of international expansion
being through master franchises, with the number of franchisors thus using master
franchises internationally having doubled from 2001 to 2006).
115.
Id.; Marisa D. Faunce & Christina M. Noyes, Agreement and Issues Related
to the Franchise Sales Process, in COLLATERAL ISSUES IN FRANCHISING: BEYOND
REGISTRATION AND DISCLOSURE 43, 69-70 (Kenneth R. Costello ed., 2014).
116.
Lee Plave, Deciding to Go International: Organizational and Business
Considerations, in FUNDAMENTALS

OF INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, 1, 16 (Will K.

Woods ed., 2d ed., 2013).
117.
Carl E. Zwisler, Selecting a Format for International Franchising, in
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 27, 42 (Marco Hero ed., 2010)
("As master franchisees act as the franchisor in their territories, franchisors [who grant
the master franchises] avoid many of the costs and legal and financial risks that they
would face in a territory if they were to grant franchises directly to unit franchisees.").
118.
Susan Grueneberg, Inbound Transactions: Introducing a Non-U.S.
Franchise Program to the

United States, in FUNDAMENTALS

OF INTERNATIONAL

FRANCHISING, supra note 116, at 329, 338. (noting that master franchise programs
permit more rapid market development, but "also results in less control over that
development by the franchisor"); Plave, supra note 116, at 19 ("One of the greatest
disadvantages of implementing a master franchise system is that the franchisor must
cede a significant amount of system control for the target market to the master
franchisee.").
119.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 2. Usually, there is no
direct relationship between the franchisor and sub-franchisee-the sub-franchisor
assumes the right to license the sub-franchisees as the franchisor in the territory and
retains the duties of a franchisor to the sub-franchisees. Id.at 3. Moreover, "[t]he
franchise relationship will almost always involve the franchisor imposing a system and
method of operation accompanied by controls." Id. at 171; see, e.g., Greil v. Travelodge
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The 2002 Model Franchise Disclosure Law' 2 0 specifically
addresses the disclosures a franchisor must make to a prospective
franchisee.121 It requires the franchisor to give these potential
franchisees detailed information on various qualities of the potential
franchisor.1 22 The disclosure document must be presented to
prospective franchisees at least fourteen days before the signing of any
agreement or the payment of a non-refundable deposit.1 23 Disclosure
issues initially considered by the Study Group included "whether the
franchisee has a statutory right to renew the agreement and whether
the franchisee has a right to cure when he/she breaches the
contract." 124 The Study Group, however, chose not to address the
relationship of the parties because prior experience had revealed that
relationship legislation had not yet proven effective.1 25 The Study

Int'l., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 1288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (quoting Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc.,
56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)).
120.
See UNIDROIT Model Franchise Disclosure Law (2002), supra note 109, at
3-4 (The Model FranchiseDisclosureLaw contains ten articles in addition to a preamble.
Article 1-deals with the scope of application of the law; Article 2-definitions; Article
3-delivery of the disclosure document; Article 4-the format of the disclosure document;
Article 5-exemptions from the obligation to disclose; Article 6-information which must
be disclosed; Article 7-acknowledgement of receipt of the disclosure document; Article
8-remedies; Article 9-the temporal scope of application of law; and Article 10waivers). The franchisee cannot waive her rights under this law-such attempts are
void. Man. Law Reform Comm'n, supra note 7, at 238; UNIDROIT Model Franchise
Disclosure Law (2002), supra note 109, at 9.
121.
"[T]he Model Law ensures that the prospective franchisees who intend to
invest in franchising receive material information about franchise offerings, thus
permitting them to make an informed investment decision. In addition, the Model Law
brings security to franchisors in their relationships with franchisees, administrative
authorities and courts." UNIDROIT Model Franchise Disclosure Law (2002), supra note
109, at 10.
122.
The Model Franchise Disclosure Law sets out a list of information that the
franchisor must include in the disclosure statement, including the franchisor's legal
name, form and address, the franchisor's principal place of business (the address), and
"the trademark, trade name, business name or similar name, under which the franchisor
carries on or intends to carry on business in the State in which the prospective franchisee
will operate the franchise business." See id. at 5-8 (for an exhaustive list of disclosure
requirements); see also id. at 4 (for potential disclosure exemptions).
123.
MAN. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 7, at 238; see also UINIDROIT Model
Franchise Disclosure Law (2002), supra note 109, at 3-4. The franchisor may deliver the
disclosure statement to the franchisee in any format, so long as it is provided in writing.
Id. at 4. The 14-day requirement does not apply to confidentiality agreements or security
deposits for confidentiality agreements. Id. at 3-4.
124.
MAN. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 7, at 237 (quoting UNIDROIT Model
Franchise Disclosure Law (2002), supra note 109, at 14).
125.
See MAN. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 7, at 237-38. Even if there is
relationship legislation, the franchise contract tends to predominate. There is an
optimistic view of the alternative to legislation (of doing nothing, hence shutting down
franchise relationship law proposals). It emphasizes that franchisors and franchisees
ought to have the freedom to make their own contract. Even though the parties
(principally, the franchisee) may well make mistakes harming their own interests, in the
long run the process of reaching and revamping agreements optimizes outcomes. A large
measure of contract freedom persists even with substantive franchise laws. Instead,
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Group reasoned that, while it could reach an agreement on disclosure
provisions, "it was far more problematic to devise common norms for
relationship issues in view of the great variety of relationships that
existed within the context of franchising." 126 Thus, the Model
Franchise Disclosure Law only addresses disclosure issues and
excludes the relationship of the parties at the international level. 127
UNIDROIT's
Guide to International Master Franchise
Arrangements (Guide) 128 focuses on the structuring of franchise
agreements, including the negotiations, the drafting, and the legal
effects of an agreement on the parties. Similarly to the Model
FranchiseDisclosure Law, the Guide was a product of the Study Group
on Franchising organized by the Governing Council of UNIDROIT in
1993.129 For the purposes of this Article, Chapter 14, "Vicarious
Liability, Indemnification and Insurance," is the most significant.
Chapter 14 of the Guide mirrors the Restatement (Third) of
Agency ("Third Restatement") when defining the potential liability of

franchise relationship laws simply establish some boundaries, but the contract fills all
within those boundaries. The main problem is that would-be franchisees, frequently
proceeding without counsel (Robert W. Emerson, FortuneFavors the Franchisor:Survey
and Analysis of the Franchisee'sDecision Whether to Hire Counsel, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
709 (2014)), fail even to consider their situation.
Franchisees ignore disclosure documents, do not compare various franchise
opportunities, and refrain from consulting with a specialized franchise attorney.
Given this reality, theoreticians and legislators interested in creating franchise
laws that protect novice franchisees from possible opportunism by franchisors
must cast doubt on the assumption that franchisees are sophisticated, wellinformed business people and incorporate into their analyses a more
representative conception of franchisee behavior. The assumption that
franchisees consider all relevant information before signing a franchise contract
has little theoretical or empirical support in actual practice, and thus the door is
open to reconsidering the adoption of franchise relationship laws.
Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting Debate Over
FranchiseRelationshipLaws," 76 ALB. L. REV. 193, 215-16 (2013).
126.
See MAN. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 7, at 238 (quoting UNIDROIT
Model Franchise Disclosure Law (2002), supra note 109, at 14).
127.
If the franchisor fails to deliver the disclosure statement within the allotted 14day period, or if the statement contains a misrepresentation or omission of material fact,
the franchisee reserves the right to terminate the franchise agreement and/or claim
damages. MAN. LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 7, at 238; see also UNIDROIT Model
Franchise Disclosure Law (2002), supra note 109, at 8. However, the franchisee may not
lawfully terminate the franchise agreement if the franchisee, "[obtained] the information
through other means, did not rely on the misrepresentation, or termination is a
disproportionate remedy in the circumstances." MAN. LAw REFORM COMM'N, supra note 7,
at 238; see also UNIDROIT Model Franchise Disclosure Law (2002), supra note 109, at 8.
128.
See supra notes 110, 111.
See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
129.
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30
franchisors.o
Similarly to the Third Restatement, 13 1 the Guide
establishes that, "in the absence of a legal relationship on which such
a claim may be based, for example an allegation that an agency
relationship exists, the franchisor is not vicariously liable for the subfranchisor's, or indeed the sub-franchisees', defaults."1 32 Thus, both the
Third Restatement and the Guide require the establishment of an
agency relationship in order for the franchisor to be vicariously liable
for the franchisees' torts.13 3
Whether an agency relationship exists, according to the Guide, is
determined by the amount of control the principal (the franchisor)
retains over the agent (the franchisee).1 34 Accordingly, "[f]or an agency
relationship to give rise to a claim, it must be based on the right of the
principal (in this case, the franchisor) to control the day-to-day
operations of the business of the agent (the sub-franchisor or subfranchisee)." 3 5 Moreover, "[i]n an agency relationship, the right to
control will extend not only to the day-to-day business, but also to the
result of the work and the manner in which the work is

accomplished."1

36

A franchisor could also be liable for the torts of its franchisee
under a theory of apparent agency.' 37 In accordance with the Guide,
"by using the franchisor's name, the sub-franchisor or sub-franchisee
are held out to the public as agents of, or indeed as being, the franchisor
and that they therefore have ostensible authority to commit the
franchisor and to make the franchisor liable for their defaults."13 8 This
description of apparent agency mirrors Section 7.08 of the Third
Restatement.1as
The Guide suggests several techniques that franchisors may
implement to avoid being held vicariously liable for the actions of a
franchisee. In order for the franchisor to escape vicarious liability, the
Guide recommends that the franchisor or sub-franchisor argue that the
franchisee did not follow instructions and did not perform in

130.

Compare Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 170, with

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006).

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006) ("An employer is subject
131.
to vicarious liability for a tort committed by its employee acting within the scope of
employment.").
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 170.
132.
133.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006); Master Franchise Guide
(2007), supranote 112, at 170.
134.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 170.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
BEYER, supra note 22, at 5.
138.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 171.
139.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (2006) ("A principal is subject
to vicarious liability for a tort committed by an agent in dealing or communicating with
a third party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal when actions taken by the agent
with apparent authority constitute the tort or enable the agent to conceal its
commission.").
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accordance
with the
franchisor's
or
the
sub-franchisor's
requirements. 140 In such instances, "the extent and conduct of the
franchisor's or sub-franchisor's method of regulating and monitoring
the sub-franchisee's business would be examined by the court, with a
view to determining whether the franchisor or sub-franchisor could
escape liability on the grounds that the sub-franchisee had failed to
observe the requirements."141 Above all, the Guide suggests that
franchisors avoid controlling the daily operations of the franchisee. 14 2
The Guide not only discusses how a franchisor can avoid liability
but also discusses when a franchisor should indemnify a franchisee and
assume sole responsibility for a tort. 143 The Guide comments that
it is natural for the franchisor to assume sole and entire responsibility for any
loss, damage, cost or expense (including court costs and reasonable legal fees)
that arise out of any claim, action, administrative inquiry or other investigation
that relates to its own operation of the business, independently of the reason for
which it was made.144

Examples of when the franchisor should assume indemnification
responsibility include product liability claims and actions for
infringement of intellectual property rights. 145 The Guide notes that
such indemnification assumptions by the franchisor should be
documented within the franchise agreement.14 6 According to the
Guide, other such contractual assumptions or waivers consist of

140.
See Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 171 (noting that a
franchise relationship is normally governed by a method of operation which includes a
system and controls).
141.
Id. In making this determination, the Guide notes, "the court would also need
to determine whether the franchisor or sub-franchisor had acted reasonably in the
enforcement or non-enforcement of the requirements." Id. at 172. Consequently, this
could place stress on the franchise relationship in light of the fact that the franchisee
might believe that he had been subjected to over-regulation. While at the same time, the
franchisor may find that in order to appease the court, he is required to enforce such
strict legal enforcement measures in order to compel the franchisee to comply. Id.
142.
Id. It should be noted, however, that some commentators believe encouraging
principals not to assert control over agents, in order to avoid liability, poses a risk to
society because principals will not ensure that their agents are using due care or taking
effective precautions to prevent harm to third parties. See generally Jennifer Arlen & W.
Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of Vicarious Liability, in
EXPLORING TORT LAW 23 (Stuart Madden ed., 2005).
143.
In U.S. franchise agreements, it is rare for a franchise contract to not have a
"hold harmless" provision with the franchisee indemnifying the franchisor for some
harms. Emerson, supra note 29, at 690 (a survey of 100 U.S. franchise agreements in
2013 found 96 percent had such a provision, up from 89 percent in a comparable 1993
survey).
144.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 173.
145.
See id. These types of liabilities can be protected against by the franchisor's
purchase of an insurance coverage policy. Susan Vincent & G. Thomas MacIntosh II,
Insuring Against Franchisor Vicarious Liability, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE
ASSOCIATION 34TH ANNUAL LEGAL SYMPosIUM (2001).

146.

Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 173.
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rules, specifying when the franchisor or sub-franchisor is entitled, or under what
circumstances either of them is obligated, to undertake or assume the defence of
any liability claim, action, inquiry or investigation, at whose risk and expense
such a defence should be undertaken and the conditions under which a
settlement might be made.147

The country of the party in which the action takes place is likely
to assume the primary defense,148 but the franchisor is generally
"entitled to choose whether or not it should itself assume the defense
against the third party's claim, always provided that this is permitted
by the procedural laws of the host country." 149 If the franchisor's
intellectual property rights are at issue, the situation differs from one
country to the next.15 0 In some jurisdictions, it is the franchisor, or the
owner, who has the right to assume the primary defense;11 however,
in other jurisdictions, it is the franchisee, or the exclusive licensee, who
has the right to assume the primary defense.1 52 Moreover, the Guide
suggests that the master franchise agreement should include "wording
prohibiting the sub-franchisor from making any representations, or
giving any warranties, with regard to any product that it has obtained
from the franchisor which go beyond the representations or warranties
given by the franchisor and/or beyond the standards usual in the host
country."1 53
The Guide also recommends that franchisors obtain, and require
their franchisees to possess, liability insurance. 154 It points out that, in
North America, Europe, and Australia, most franchise agreements
require sub-franchisors to take out liability insurance against thirdparty claims, as well as against property risks. 5 5 Further, the
franchisee is usually also required to have liability insurance to guard
against other potential risks.' 5 6 A clause requiring the sub-franchisor

147.
Id. at 174.
148.
If the party hosting the action chooses the primary defense he is expected to
provide the other party or parties with full information on the progress of the
proceedings. Nonetheless, the primary defense may always be chosen by the party who
is ultimately facing liability. Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.; see Robert W. Emerson & Catherine R. Willis, InternationalFranchise
Trademark Registration: Legal Regimes, Costs and Consequences, 52 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017), for analysis of varying trademark registration rights and
duties, including the law and data related to trademark applications accepted or rejected
in nations such as Australia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and South Korea.
151.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supranote 112, at 174.
152.
Id.
153.
Id. at 175.
See Vincent & MacIntosh, supranote 145, at 10.
154.
155.
See Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 175 (noting that these
contractual clauses may only provide for a sub-franchisor's general obligation to take out
an "appropriate" insurance policy).
156.
Id.; Emerson, supra note 29, at 690 (a survey of 100 U.S. franchise
agreements in 2013 found 97 percent had a provision expressly requiring the franchisee
to pay for comprehensive liability insurance); see also Perkins et al., supra note 21, at
176 (providing a sample insurance clause including property insurance, business
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or franchisee to obtain insurance should be included within the master
franchise agreement.1 57 Accordingly, it is suggested that the franchisor
and sub-franchisor "discuss the liability risks that exist in the host
country, not only under statutory law but also under case law, as well
as what insurance coverage is available or usually taken out in that
country."1 5 8 The Guide advises this because there are some countries
where taking out an insurance policy against third-party liability is
59
Thus, discussing such
unusual, expensive, or simply unavailable.s
potential battles beforehand will help avoid an increased risk of, and
the costs associated with, a potential lawsuit.1 60
Typically, the insurance clause would be included in the master
franchise agreement and should "prescribe that the sub-franchisor
shall at its own expense take out and maintain full insurance cover
[sic] in all cases for which it is required by law, or for which it is
otherwise necessary or at least useful in order to ensure the continued
existence of the sub-franchisor."i'6 The Guide further suggests that the
franchisor "fix minimum coverage for damage to property and for
damages caused by the interruption of business, as well as for third
party liability risks for personal injury, death, damages to property and
product liability."'

62

The minimum amount of coverage the franchisor

requires the sub-franchisor or franchisee to maintain should be
periodically reviewed to ensure that it is in accordance with the host
state's policies.' 6 3 If needed, it should be adjusted to reflect the
minimum amount of insurance coverage required by the host state.1 64
The franchisor should also require insurance coverage that
encompasses both the franchisor generally and "its directors, officers,
shareholders, partners or other licensees whenever the interests of

&

interruption insurance, general liability insurance, automobile insurance, and worker's
compensation).
See Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 175 (further
157.
commenting, "[s]uch contractual clauses may at times only provide for general obligation
to 'take out an appropriate insurance policy,' leaving it to the sub-franchisor or subfranchisee to decide what it considers to be 'appropriate,' but often the cover needed will
be specified").
Id.
158.
159.
Id. at 176.
160.
See Daniel Allen & Mindy Haverson, Note, An Alternative Approach to
Vicarious Liability for InternationalAccounting Firm Networks, 15 STAN. J.L. Bus.
FIN. 426, 446 (2010) (citing King, supra note 18, arguing that franchisors who require
franchisees to carry liability insurance can limit risk when aggrieved parties would
otherwise attempt to hold the franchisor vicariously liable).
161.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 176.
Id.
162.
See id. (discussing insurance coverage meeting "the risks and practice
163.
prevailing in the host country").
Id. A 2013 survey of 100 fast food, restaurant, and ice cream parlor franchise
164.
agreements found that the median level of coverage for comprehensive liability
insurance found that 97 percent compelled the franchisee to pay for the insurance, with
the median level of required insurance coverage for all the agreements being $2 million.
Emerson, supra note 29, at 690.
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these persons may be affected by the risks covered by the insurance
policies."1 65 A host country must allow such an extension of insurance
coverage,1 66 but, even if such an extension is permitted, it may not be
worth the extensive costs required to do so.1 67 If a host country does
not permit an extension of the insurance policy, such an extension will
be very costly for the franchisor. The Guide suggests, "it might be more
appropriate for the franchisor to extend its own insurance coverage to
possible risks stemming from third parties and to recover additional
insurance premium through the franchise fee."' 68 While stressing the
importance of insurance coverage, the Guide maintains that this is
only one of many factors in establishing a "healthy commercial law
environment," which is of paramount importance for franchising.' 69
In addition to these organizational considerations, the Guide goes
on to discuss other important issues pertaining to international
franchising. In particular, international legislation and rules relevant
to franchising are discussed in Annex Three of the Guide.170 Annex
Three notes that franchise regulations are essentially divided into two
categories.1 71 The first includes laws that apply to contracts in general,
and the second includes laws that apply specifically to franchise
regulation.' 7 2 Laws that are franchise-specific encompass "agency law
73
and the law regulating other distribution contracts."s
The Guide
explains that "[t]here may be aspects of the relationship between a
franchisor and its franchisees that are covered by agency law,
independently of whether the courts actually assimilate the franchise
relationship concerned to one of agency, or by the law regulating other
distribution contracts."1 74 Therefore, the Guide advises that legislation

165.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 176-77.
166.
Id. at 177; see Luisa Soares de Silva et al., Civil Liability Inurance. Contracts
for Directors Under Portuguese Company Code, EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS 3099 (2008)
(explaining that despite the prevalence of Director's and Officer's Insurance in the
United States and United Kingdom, it is a relatively new and developing concept
throughout Continental Europe and Asia).
167.
UNIDROIT Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 177.
168.
Id.
Id. at 276; see also Allen & Haverson, supra note 160, at 447 (asserting that
169.
insurance "does not provide sufficiently strong incentives to individual member firms
and that it does not do enough to deter member firm misconduct").
170.
See Master Franchise Guide (2007), supranote 112, at 276 (noting these laws
and regulations are in addition to those regulating commercial contracts or intellectual
property rights).
Id.
171.
172.
Id.
173.
Id. Other areas of law that are discussed include: general contract law,
leasing and security interests, financial investments, intellectual property, competition
law, fair trade practices law, corporate law, taxation, property law, legislation on
consumer protection and product liability, insurance law, labor law, the law regulating
the transfer of technology, legislation regulating foreign investments currency control
regulations and import restrictions and/or quotas, legislation regulating joint ventures,
and industry specific laws or regulations. See generally id. at 276-81.
174.
Id. at 276-77.
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that regulates agency relationships and distribution contracts be
considered when analyzing a franchise relationship. 175
Annex Three also discusses a nation's implementation, or lack
thereof, of franchise-specific legislation. 176 The Guide notes that, while
an increasing number of nations have implemented franchise-specific
legislation, "still only a limited number regulate franchising." 7 7
Moreover, implementation of franchise-specific legislation in those
nations is generally limited to domestic rather than international
franchise regulations.' 7 8 This lack of international franchise
regulation is due in large part to "the complexity of the relationship
and to the great number of areas of law involved in a franchise
relationship."179
When nations adopt franchise-specific legislation, the regulations
usually concern disclosure rules rather than governance of the
relationship between the parties.18 0 Annex Three explains that, while
the degree and detail of the information required to be disclosed varies
from nation to nation, generally "the laws will require the franchisor
to provide the prospective franchisee with information on a number of
points that will enable the franchisee to make an informed decision on

Id. at 277. Comparable statements about distribution or agency law affecting
175.
franchise laws have been made about the law in numerous countries, with four examples
being Spain, Austria, Italy, and Germany. Ignacio Alonso, Spain, in GETTING THE DEAL
-

THROUGH - DISTRIBUTION & AGENCY IN 17 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 90, 94 (Andre R.
Jaglom ed., 2015); Gustav Breiter, Austria, in GETrING THE DEAL THROUGH
DISTRIBUTION & AGENCY IN 17 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE, supra note 175, at 5, 6;
Marco De Leo, Italy, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH - DISTRIBUTION & AGENCY IN 17
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE, supra note 175, at 71, 71-72; Martin Rothermel & Benedikt
Rohrssen, Germany, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH - DISTRIBUTION & AGENCY IN 17
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE, supra note 175, at 59, 60, 63; see also ANDRE R. JAGLOM,
DISTRIBUTION CONTRACTS (2014), http://www.thsh.com/Publications/Other-

Publications/Distribution-Contracts.aspx#.VX2JvkrKUI [https://perma.cc/XD6S-3889]
(archived Jan. 30, 2017) (discussing the same concepts--distribution and agency law
impacting franchise law-with respect to U.S. law). The reverse can also apply: franchise
legislation reaching distributorships. See ANDRE R. JAGLOM, THE BROAD SCOPE OF
FRANCHISE

LAWS:

TRAPS

FOR

THE

DISTRIBUTION

CONTRACT

DRAFTER

(2014),

http://www.thsh.com/documents/The-Broad-Scope-of-Franchise-Laws-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RDD2-U3PW] (archived Jan. 28, 2017) (discussing how broadly worded
state franchise legislation in the United States often affects distribution contracts).
176.
See Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 281; compare Rose M.
Faria,

France

Serves

as

a

Gateway

to

Europe,

INT'L

FRANCHISE

ASS'N,

http://www.franchise.org/franchise-news-detail.aspx?id=33190 (last visited Jan. 28,
2017) [https://perma.cc/ZN98-JSNH] (archived Jan. 23, 2017) (discussing France's long
history of franchise-specific legislation) with Bryan Schwartz & Leandro Zylberman,
Event Summary: Franchise Symposium Materials:InternationalFranchiseRegulation,
8 ASPER REV. INTL BUS. & TRADE L. 317, 335 (2008) (discussing Italy's lack of franchisespecific legislation until 2004).
177.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 281.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
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whether or not to enter into the agreement."181 A comparative analysis
of the recent period of adoption of franchise-specific legislation shows
that, with the exception of the Russian Civil Code, every nation's
franchise laws, in some way, deal with the disclosure requirements
reflected in UNIDROIT's Guide. 182
These franchise-specific laws also usually provide a definition of
which relationships constitute franchises. For example, in Malaysia,
the law dictates that the relationship is established where the
franchisee operates a business separately from the franchisor, such
that he is not an agent, partner, or service contract provider. 8 3 One
would thus think that the franchisor, as a known separate business,
would not ordinarily be vicariously liable for the franchisee's acts.
However, a country defining the franchise relationship in this way (and
Malaysia is just one of dozens of nations that does so) does not exclude
franchisors from potential vicarious liability under actual or apparent
authority.1 84 Thus, to continue with the Malaysian example, the
Malaysian courts have found that a franchisor can be held vicariously
liable under theories of actual or apparent authority whenever the
franchisor has some control over third parties or franchisees.1 8 5
Ultimately, the Guide is, as its name suggests, a guide to what
regulations nations should implement.1 86 However, although there are
many differences between the types, texts, and levels of detail of
instruments regulating franchising agreements, national franchising
laws mostly require the same type of information as UNIDROIT
recommends. 87 In analyzing the disclosure laws of various nations,
the Guide illustrates their considerable variance18"
B. Model Nations

Specifically, Annex Three notes the following points which the franchisor
181.
should disclose to the franchisee: the franchisor and the directors of the enterprise; the
history of the enterprise; the legal constitution of the enterprise; the intellectual property
concerned; the financial situation, with audited financial statements for the two or three
preceding years; the other franchisees in the network; information on the franchise
agreement, such as the duration of the agreement, conditions of renewal, termination
and assignment of the agreement; as well as information on any exclusivities. Id.
182.

LENA PETERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE

LAW (UNIDROIT) 48-49 (Roger Blanpain ed. 2011); Kerkovic, supra note 95, at 257.
183.

Leela Baskaran, Malaysia, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, supra note 12,

at MAY/1, MAY/32.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.

186.

See Kerkovic, supra note 95, at 257.

187.

Id.

188.
Nations with such varying approaches to disclosure include Albania,
Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Canada (Alberta, Ontario and Prince Edward
Island), China, Croatia, Estonia, France, Georgia, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Ukraine, United States, and Vietnam. See generally id. at 282-301.
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The following discussion highlights some of the regulatory
schemes that have emerged in some important and representative
jurisdictions. As previously mentioned, the regulatory schemes of the
countries discussed are largely dependent on their roots in either a
common law or a civil law system.
1. The European Union
The scope of the European Union's franchising legislation was
defined with the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) decisions in the
case of Pronuptiade Paris GmbH (Frankfurt am Main) and Pronuptia
de ParisIrmgardSchillgalis (Hamburg).189 The German Federal Court
of Justice referred these cases to the ECJ for the purposes of
establishing a ruling on the interpretation of Article 85 of the European
Economic Community (EEC) Treaty.19 0 This Treaty deals with
particular categories of exclusive dealing agreements.191 The ECJ
determined that "the franchisor must be in a position to protect certain
interests vital to the business and to the identity of the network (for
example, the know-how), although the provisions must be essential for
this purpose."' 9 2 Accordingly, after Pronuptia, the Commission of the
European Union rendered decisions on five franchising cases 9 3 and
ultimately accepted a Block Exemption Regulation on franchise
agreements.1 94
The Block Exemption Regulation entered into force on February
1, 2000 and identified the different categories of franchise agreements
to which it applied:' 95 Article 2 of the regulation indicated "to which
restrictions of competition the exemption should apply"; Article 3
indicated "to which it should apply notwithstanding the presence of
certain obligations"; Article 4 addressed "to which it should apply on
certain conditions"; and Article 5 dealt with exemptions "[to] which it
should not apply."1 96 The regulation also supplied an opposition

189.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supranote 112, at 301 (citing Case 161/84 of
28 January 1986).
190.
Id.
191.
See id. (noting that the German Federal Court of Justice sought a ruling on
the application of Article 85(3) of the ECC Treaty to certain exclusive dealing
agreements). Specifically, it concerns potential quarrels over a franchisee's obligation to
pay the franchisor for any arrears on fees. Id.
192.
Id. at 301-02.
193.
Commission Decision 87/14, 1987 O.J. (L 8) 49 (EC); Commission Decision
87/17, 1987 O.J. (L 13) 39 (EC); Commission Decision 87/407, 1987 O.J. (L 222) 12 (EC);
Commission Decision 88/604, 1988 O.J. (L 332) 38 (EC); Commission Decision 89/94,
1989 O.J. (L 35) 31 (EC); Master Franchise Guide (2007), supranote 112, at 302 n.131.
194.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112 at 302 (citing Commission
Regulation 4087/88, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 46 (EC) (explaining the application of Article 85(3)
of the Treaty to categories of franchise agreements)).
195.
Id. at 302.
196.
See id. (discussing the application of the various Articles in the Franchising
Block Exemption Regulation).
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procedure at Article 6.197 After just four months, however, the
regulation was superseded by the Block Exemption Regulation on
Vertical Restraints, 198 which entered into force on June 1, 2000.199
Unlike its predecessor, this new exemption did not specifically mention
"franchising." 20 0 Nonetheless, "the Guidelines that accompany the text
make it quite clear that it applies also to franchising."2 01 These rules,
affecting a wide range of sales of goods and services, address highly
significant points for franchises, including intellectual property issues
and in-term and post-term noncompetitive provisions. 202
2. France
There is a notable distinction between agency doctrine in common
law countries, such as the United States, and civil law countries, such
as France (and many other Member States of the European Union): in
the analysis of vicarious liability claims, courts in civil law countries
focus far more on the reasonable expectations of consumers, as opposed
to the extent of a franchisor's control over its franchisee. 203 Thus,
disclaimers in advertisements and at franchisee locations that serve a
notice function-to indicate the independence of the franchise
corporation-naturally play a more vital role in combating vicarious
liability claims. 204 Accordingly, the absence of disclaimers as to the
independence of a franchise corporation can prove fatal in civil law
liability claims. 205

France provides an illuminating example of mature franchise law.
The country boasts the largest franchising market in Europe, with
total sales of $51.6 billion and more than 929 franchisors. 206 Similarly

&

197.
Id. at 302 n.138.
198.
Id. at 303-04 (citing Commission Regulation 2790/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21
(EC) on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements
and concerted practices); The focus of this Regulation is the vertical agreements that fall
under Article 81(3), including "agreements for the purchase or sale of goods or services
where these agreements are concluded between non-competing undertakings, between
certain competitors or by certain associations of retailers of goods, [and] vertical
agreements containing ancillary provisions on the assignment or use of intellectual
property rights." However, the Regulation does not prohibit all restrictions on vertical
agreements. In fact, some vertical restraints are permitted, including those that have a
positive effect, such as "the improvement of economic efficiency." Moreover, highly anticompetitive restraints, including fixed resale prices and territorial protections, cannot
reap the benefit of the exemption.
199.
Id. at 303.
200.
See id. (noting that Commission Regulation 2790/1999 does not mention
franchising in its text).
201.
Id. at 303-04 (citing Commission Notice, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1 (EC)).
202.
Id. at 304 (citing Commission Regulation (EC) 2790/1999 at arts. 2(3)
5(a)(b)).
203.

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15.

204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Faria, supra note 176.
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to the United States, France has a rich history in franchising, which
dates back to the 1930s when a knitting company started to "franchise"
its business model in France.20 7 Soon after the start of franchising, in
a 1937 case, 208 the French Supreme Court recognized the test for
vicarious liability "to be one of authority and subordination,
characterized by 'the right to give the employee (prdpose) orders or
instructions as to the manner in which he shall undertake the
functions for which he is employed."' 20 9 Then, in the 1970s, franchising
started to grow and began appearing in all sectors of the economy,
analogously to the development patterns in the United States. This
growing market precipitated the need for franchising-specific
legislation. 210
In 1989, the French Assembly became the first EU Member State
to implement legislation addressing this issue when it passed Act. No.
89-1008, known as Loi Doubin (codified in the French Commercial
Code as Art. L.330-3). 211 Although Loi Doubin is not franchise specific,
it relates to all forms of commercial arrangements whose contracts
contain exclusivity clauses. 212 It, therefore, details requirements that
apply to franchisors as well as other licensors, including disclosure of
relevant dates and descriptions, but refrains from addressing any
franchise-specific relationship issues that would arise after the initial
formation of the agreement. 213 Thus, discussion of the vicarious
liability of franchisors is absent from Loi Doubin.
France still lacks any formal legislation directed at the ongoing
relationship aspects of franchise agreements. Instead, general contract
law largely governs these issues. 214 However, in the event that a
franchisor exercises sufficient control over the franchisee, the latter
may be viewed as an employee, which would lead to the application of
French labor law. 2 15 This labor law test focuses on whether there is a

207.
Id.
208.
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] le civ., May
4, 1937, Bull. civ. I, No. 95 (Fr.).
209.

PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

58-59 (2010).
210.
Faria, supra note 176.
211.

R6mi Delforge & Gilles Menguy, France, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE

SALES LAWS 161, 165 (Andrew P. Loewinger & Michael K. Lindsey eds., 2015).
212.
National Regulation by Country, EUROPEAN FRANCHISE FED'N, tbl.1,
http://www.unidroit.org/guide-franchise-2nd-national-info/131-instruments/franchising/
guide/guide-2edition/national-information-2nd-franchise/country/299-france-legislation
-and-regulations-relevant-to-franchising (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
BU4T-VWDY] (archived Mar. 4, 2017).
213.
See Delforge & Menguy, supra note 211, at 165-66 (setting forth the one
article Loi Doubin as adopted by Decree 91-337).
214.
See Kerkovic, supra note 95, at 113 (noting that French law merely requires
the parties to make certain disclosures before entering into a franchising agreement).
215.

Emanuel Schulte, France, in FRANCHISE IN 30 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE

62, 63 (Philip F. Zeidman ed., 2014), http://www.franchise.org/sites/default/files/ek-pdfs/
html page/F2014-France 0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UJ6-QEZ3] (archived Jan. 17, 2017).
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"subordination link" between the franchisor and franchisee. 216 In
particular, subordination may exist where the franchisee's duty merely
consists of selling goods that are predominantly supplied by the
franchisor, at conditions and prices set by the franchisor, and in
premises owned or rented by the franchisor, or where the franchisee's
remuneration largely depends on the conditions instituted by the
franchisor. 2 17 Despite the relative clarity of the direct subordination
link, questions abound with respect to potential liability between
parties to the franchise contract and third parties.
If labor law does not apply, general contract law, as set out in the
French Civil Code, indicates that a contract may establish liabilities
only between the contracting parties and not between third parties. 218
This is because the French test of subordination juridique (legal
subordination) focuses on "identifying who has the right to give orders
or instructions to the employee as to how to do their job." 219 A 2006
French Supreme Court decision rejected this rigid approach, however,
and moved toward a more flexible interpretation, finding that a third
party may have an action based in tort. In that case, a commercial
tenant's managing agent (the third party) had a claim in tort against
a landlord who had breached the lease with the tenant.220 Thus, "the
power to give instructions need not have a contractual or legal basis,
but instead may simply exist as a matter of fact .

.

. it is no longer

necessary to prove that such power has been exercised," as long as the
person in question is found to possess authority over the alleged
subordinate.221

Furthermore, while French law views the franchisee as the
employer of its own employees, if there is a direct subordination link
between the franchisor and the franchisee's employees, there is a risk
that the franchisor may be deemed to be their employer, which could
lead to vicarious liability, and even criminal sanctions under certain
circumstances. 222 Thus, a "franchisor not fulfilling its contractual
obligations towards a franchisee which consequently is no longer able
to pay the suppliers, may face an action brought by the same suppliers
for the damages they suffered." 223 In hopes of avoiding this risk, it is
crucial for franchisors to ensure that the franchisee is the sole decision-

216.
217.

Id. at 63.
Id.

218.

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 14.

219.
GILIKER, supra note 209, at 66.
220.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 14 (citing Cour de cassation [Cass.]
[supreme court for judicial matters] ass. pl~n., Oct. 6, 2006, No. 541 (Fr.)). The French
court held that a third party has an action in tort against a contracting party by proving
that the contracting party committed a civil wrong by breaching the contract; in other
words, the third party may seek compensation, based on tort principles, by invoking the
contractual fault of a party whose breach caused him damage.
221.
GLIKER, supra note 209, at 66.
222.
Schulte, supra note 215, at 63.
223.

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 14.
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maker in hiring, providing work instructions, supervising, and
sanctioning and terminating the employment contracts of the
franchisee's employees. 224
Additional regulation comes from the Code of Ethics, promulgated
by the French Franchise Federation (FFF). 225 Although FFF
membership is not mandatory for French franchise corporations, the
Code nevertheless provides insight into commonly recommended and
expected behavior. 226
In France, the simplest, yet perhaps most effective restraint on
any claim of vicarious liability against franchisors is the national
administrative order, known as the Neiertz Decree.227 This decree
requires every franchisee to identify its ownership status and to inform
consumers that the franchisee is an independent business distinct from
its franchisor: "[a]nyone selling products or providing services that is
bound by a franchise agreement with a franchisor must inform the
consumer of its being an independent business, in a legible and visible
manner on all information documents, especially advertising, as well
as inside and outside the point of sale." 2 28 This administrative decree

"essentially

aims to promote

franchised nature of a business.

229

customer

knowledge"

about

the

It is thus meant "to ensure that the

consumer does not think he is dealing directly with the franchisor or
the parent company." 230 In effect, such Neiertz Decree notices, whether
on sales receipts, invoices, in any other correspondence, on a website,
in an advertisement, or in any sign or posting at the franchise's
physical location (e.g., its office or store), tend to make apparent
authority impossible for most practical purposes, both according to the

224.
Id. at 15.
225.
See generally EUR. FRANCHISE FED'N, EUR. CODE OF ETHICS FOR
FRANCHISING (2003).
226.
Id.
227.
In the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Budget, the State
Secretary of Consumer Affairs issuing the Decree of February 21, 1991 was Veronique
Neiertz, hence the shorthand title, I'arrdtdNeiertz ("the Neiertz Decree").
D&cret du 21 f6vrier 1991 relatif A l'information du consommateur dans le
228.
secteur de la franchise [Decree of Febuary 21, 1991 on Consumer Information in the
Franchise Sector], Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], Mar. 1, 1991, p. 2963 (<Toute personne vendant des produits ou fournissant des
services, like par un accord de franchise A un franchiseur, doit informer le consommateur
de sa qualit6 d'entreprise ind6pendante, de manibre lisible et visible, sur 'ensemble des
documents d'information, notamment de nature publicitaire, ainsi qu'A 'int~rieur et A
1'extdrieur du lieu de vente.e) (Eng. trans. by author).
Annuaire et Conseil pour rdussir en Franchise, AC FRANCHISE SARL,
229.
http://ac-franchise.com/pagellarrete-neiertz (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
9R48-YS8Y] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) (The decree < vise essentiellement A faire connaitre
>) (Eng. trans. by author).
A la clientile la qualite de franchis6 de commergant ...
Id. (<< qui la sert pour que le consommateur ne pense pas qu'il a affaire
230.
directement avec le franchiseur ou la maison-mbre. ") (Eng. trans. by author).
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French and English language and under both French and AngloAmerican law. 231

3. Italy
Unlike France, Italy seemed to ignore the commercial practice of
franchising, declining to implement any real legislative discipline until
very recently.23 2 Most scholars believe this lack of discipline was
probably one of the key reasons for the rapid expansion of franchises
in Italy and throughout Europe in the last few decades. 233 However,
this utter lack of discipline made it impossible to establish a consistent
definition of franchise and, consequently, spawned numerous
controversies. 234 Finally, in 2005, thirty years after the first
appearance of a franchise agreement in the country, Italy enacted a
franchise law 235 and provided a legislative framework for
franchising 236 in Law Number 129/2004, although this law did not
contain any specific provision on a franchisor's vicarious liability.237
In light of Law Number 129/2004's failure to address vicarious
liability, scholars have turned to the Italian civil code and case law in
order to determine a franchisor's vicarious liability for the acts of its
franchisee.23 8 Identically to French law, under a general rule detailed
in the Italian civil code, a contract may be binding and effective only

231.
The meaning of "impossible" is the same in French and English. More
important, such notices-whether in France's Civil Law or in the Anglo-American
common law-destroy any reasonable basis for a customer's reliance on a presumed
agency relationship. Although not required by statute in the United States, "plain
notices about independent ownership and operations should be part of the effort to warn
a franchised chain's customers and potential customers that the risks of tort losses and
contract breaches are not incurred by the franchisor." Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors'
Liability When FranchiseesAre Apparent Agents: An Empirical and Policy Analysis of
"Common Knowledge"About Franchising,20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 609, 669 (1992). In fact,
most U.S. franchise agreements now likely require the franchisee to post notices telling
the public about the franchisee's independent status. Emerson, supra note 29, at 697
(explaining a survey of 100 U.S. franchise agreements found 79 percent had such a
clause, up from just 21 percent of the agreements in a comparable survey in 1993).
232.
Schwartz & Zylberman, supra note 176, at 335 (noting that "Italy first
adopted franchise legislation on 21 April 2004, with the introduction of the Law on
CommercialAffiliation").
233.
Valentina Giarrusso, Franchise Agreements Under Italian Law, in THE
COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 493, 494 (Dennis Campbell

ed., 2007).
234.
Id. at 494-95; see also Francesca Ferrero & Julia Holden, Italy, in
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, supra note 12, at ITA/16 (arguing that the lack of specific
franchise law in Italy contributed to a growth of "'atypical' contracts").
235.
Decreto Ministeriale 2 settembre 2005, G.U. n. 129 /2004 (It.).
236.
Id. at 4.
237.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supranote 15, at 11; see also Aldo Frignani & Francesca
Turitto, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISE SALES LAWS supra note 211, at 237, 240

(the law's scope includes disclosure, rights of use, and obligations of the parties, but does
not mention vicarious liability).
238.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.
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between the parties entering into it. Thus, a franchisor may only be
liable to a third party under particular circumstances for liability in
tort. 239 Yet, just as French courts broadened this rigid approach,
Italian courts have established two legal bases for holding a franchisor
liable for the conduct of its franchisees or a franchisee's employees. 240
First, a third party may bring suit against a franchisor for the
franchisee's acts if the franchisor and the franchisee appear to be one
single entity and the third party reasonably believes that it is entering
into an agreement with an agent of the franchisor. 241 Thus, Italian
courts have held that a franchisor may be vicariously liable for the
tortious acts of a franchisee that is its apparent agent. 242 The apparent
agent doctrine was first applied in Italy in GrimaldiS.p.A. v. Magatelli
Effci S.a.s., where the Court of Milan ruled that, in order to build a
case of vicarious liability, the apparent agency relationship must be (1)
based on objective grounds, (2) generated because of franchisor
instructions and contractual forms, and (3) arising from the third
party's reasonable reliance upon a good faith belief that the franchisor
and the franchisee are the same entity.2 43 Therefore, to avoid this risk,
the franchisor and the franchisee must make it obvious to third parties
that they are independent and autonomous entities and that the
244
franchisee is not an agent of the franchisor.

Second, if the franchisor has the right and the power to control
and manage a franchisee, then the franchisor may be liable for that
franchisee's conduct. 245 The franchisor's vicarious liability as the
controlling company may occur when the franchisor has the right to
hire and fire, sets hours of work and rates of pay, and gives directions
on the work performed by the franchisee's personnel. 246 In addition,
similarly to some U.S. jurisdictions, a franchisor could be liable if it

239.
Id.; see also Decreto Ministeriale 2 settembre 2005, G.U. n. 129 /2004 (It.).
240.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 11; compare Pretura Milano, 21 luglio
1992, Contratti, pag. 173 n. DE NOVA, Franchising ed Apparenza, 1993 (establishing
the grounds to build a case of vicarious liability based upon the apparent agency
relationship), with Tribunale di Milano, 25 giugno 2005, Rivista giuridica del lavoro e
previdenza, 97, ss, 2006 (determining the liability of a franchisor as a "controlling
company" or as a company exercising direction and coordination activity).
241.

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.

242.
Maria Elena Giorcelli et al., Vicarious Liability of the Franchisor for Acts
and Omissions of the Franchisees and their Employees: Canada, Italy and The United
States (2013) (unpublished presentation), www.idiproject.com:8000/medialmaterials/24PanelZwisler.ppt [https://perma.cc/ZSG6-QFZ6] (archived Feb. 11, 2017).
243.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 12; (citing Pretura Milano, 21 luglio
1992, in Contratti, pag. 173 n. DE NOVA, Franchising ed Apparenza, 1993).
244.
See Ferrero & Holden, supra note 234, at ITA/17; RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 15, at 11.
245.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supranote 15, at 11; see also Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips
Elecs, N.V., 85 A.3d 725, 798-807 (Del. Ch. 2014) (comparing Delaware and Italian law
of vicarious liability outside of franchising context, where Delaware law turned on
apparent agency but Italian law turned on employer control).
246.

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 11.
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controls the uniformity and the standardization of products and
services. 247 In a recent decision, an Italian court held that, if a
franchisor can contractually control the quantity, colors, and products
to be sold by the franchisees, the franchisor may be held liable. 248 In
this regard, the franchisor and franchisee may be reclassified, for the
purposes of the labor laws, as a single unified employer-that is, the
franchise agreement is seen as a surreptitious instrument to jointly
manage two businesses disguised as a franchise relationship. 249
Therefore, it is in the franchisor's best interest to limit its powers to
direct the franchisee's business within the franchise agreement and to
avoid management of the franchisee's personnel within their day-today operations. 250
4. Germany
In Germany, the franchisee is ultimately liable "for all obligations
resulting from its activity, especially for claims for damages of all
kinds." 251 However, the franchisor generally cannot escape product
liability claims.

252

But, if the franchisor was not at fault for the

particular defect, he may be able to exempt himself under the
Produkthaftungsgesetz-ProdHaftG(Product Liability Act). 253 Section

1(3) of the Product Liability Act states that the liability of the
manufacturer of a component part is exempt if the mistake is caused
by the construction of the product in which a part of the product is
incorporated, or if the harm resulted because of the product
manufacturer's instructions. 254 In a case where the franchisor and
franchisee are both at fault, they are both jointly and severally liable
to the harmed party. 255 To each other, however, they are liable only for
the share of damage they caused individually. 256 In order for the
franchisor, as the quasi-manufacturer, to avoid liability, it must not
allow the consumer to assume that it is the manufacturer. 257 Thus, the
franchisor should ensure that notice is provided for any product that

247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 13.
Id.; Tribunale di Pescara, 2 febbraio 2009, Foro it. 2009, I, 2829 (It.).
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supranote 15, at 12-13.
Id. at 12.

251.

Stefan Bretthauer, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, supra note

12, at GER/28-29.
252.
Id.
253.
Id.
254.
Produkthaftungsgesetz [ProdHaftG] [Product Liability Act], Dec. 15, 1989,
BGBlI at 2198, § 1 (Ger.), (translated at http://www.utexas.edullaw/academics/centers/
transnationallworknew/german/case.php?id=1397
(last visited Jan 22, 2017)
[https://perma.ccVDC7-TZDR] (archived Jan. 22, 2017)); see Bretthauer, supranote 251,
at GER/29-30 (outlining how Germany's Product Liability Act may or may not affect
franchisors).
255.
Id.
256.
Id. (citing the Product Liability Act, Section 5).
257.
See Bretthauer, supra note 251, at GER/30.
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the franchisee actually manufactures by having the franchisee attach
a note asserting that the franchisor is not the manufacturer of the
finished product. 25 8 However, this policy of notification may not be the
best strategy for a franchisor striving for uniformity throughout the
franchises.25 9 Franchisors will want to weigh the importance of
uniformity against the risk of liability.2 6 0

Ultimately, German case law no longer requires a detailed right
of control for vicarious liability: "it is sufficient that the employer can
at any time determine the scope and duration of the tasks of the
employee, restrict them or terminate them." Thus, the focus is no
longer on the fact of the franchisor actually instructing the franchisee
how to do his job, but rather on the ability of the franchisor to do so. 261
In 2007, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany issued decision
XZR 137/04,262 reinforcing the concept that a franchisor may become
bound by contracts between its franchisee and a customer where the
franchisee does not disclose to the general public that it is a legally
independent entity. 263 Thus, there exists a possible source of vicarious
liability for the acts of the franchisee if a third party assumes that the
franchisee is acting on behalf of the franchisor and the franchisor
knows or should have known this but does not mind. 264 The franchisee
is then considered to be an agent of the franchisor. 26 5 This risk could
be minimized by the franchisor denying agency in the franchise
agreement, ensuring that the franchisee identifies itself as an
independent business (including by registering a business name), or

258.
Id.
259.
The more the individual franchisee controls production, and thus protects
the franchisor from potential liability for a product defect, the more likelihood of variance
in production within the network.
260.
See Bretthauer, supra note 251, at GER/29
GILIKER, supra note 209, at 66-67.
261.
is
found
at:
translation
of
the
decision
262.
An
English
http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=de&u=http://www.telemedicus.info/urte
ile/Marken-und-Namensrecht/Domainnamen/689-BGH-Az-I-ZR-13704-EuroTelekom.html&prev-/search%3Fq%3Dtelekom%2Bzr%2Bl37/04%26client%3Dfirefoxa%26hs%3DYZM%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official (last visited Jan. 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/8CFG-VUHN] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
263.
In German law, a franchisor could be liable to third parties for the
franchisee's acts under one or more of these situations: (1) contractual liability to
consumers due to the franchisee's appearance, in terms of its legal position; (2) "tortious
organisational liability"; (3) liability of a franchisor-producer of a defective product sold
by a franchisee; (4) on occasion, when a franchisee commits an act of unfair competition
of the franchisee. Marco Hero, Country Report Germany, in Int'l Distribution Inst.,
Franchising Country Reports, at 10 (2015); Bretthauer, supra note 251, at GER/1,
GER/27-31. The first situation encompasses apparent authority as a possible ground for
franchisor liability due to franchisee actions.
264.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 15; see also BGH Dec. 18, 2007, XZR
137/04, §§ 164, 242, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/
document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art-en&Datum=2007&Seite=3&nr-42638&pos=118&anz3318 [https://perma.cclWN79-PN7E] (archived Mar. 5, 2017).
265.
Id.
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ensuring that the franchisee has to bear the liability in the internal
relationship. 266
5. China
China is currently experiencing a rapid expansion of
franchising. 267 And, over the last twenty years, China has developed a
comprehensive legal framework governing franchises, including laws
dealing with both disclosure requirements and relationship issues. 268
Yet, because of China's unique isolationist policy, franchising was not
easily adopted. 269 With China's concurrent commitments to market
development and to political socialism, the development of franchising
in China has been something of an enigma as compared to the
traditional adoption of franchising in European countries. 270 In the
early 1990s, the word "franchise" had no direct Chinese translation;
instead, the closest translation amounted to "chain of stores." 27' In
spite of its isolationist policies, however, the Chinese government
began to recognize the viability of a "chain of stores" (or franchise) as a
business structure. 272 Although, even as the country cracked its doors
open to foreign investment, it has maintained a cautious approach in
structuring its rules governing foreign enterprises.2 73
Franchising in China has developed from being unrecognized and
unregulated to becoming a viable, increasingly adopted business
model. 274 At first, the Chinese government did not formally regulate

franchising, but-in order to foster it-the government issued Interim
Measures on RegulatingFranchiseOperations(Franchise Measures) in
1997.275 Article 5 of these measures identified two types of franchise
structures: (1) a direct franchise and (2) a franchise that allows master

266.
Id.
267.
See Ilan Alon & Ke Bian, FranchisingProfile and Practicesin the People's
Republic of China, 1 IBAT J. MGMT. 98, 100-05 (2004) (highlighting the rapid growth of
franchising in different sectors in China, including food, retail, real estate, health,
education, and services).
268.
See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
MEASURES FOR THE REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL FRANCHISE art. 9-12, 19 (2005),

http://www.lapres.net/franchise.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ5K-58Z5] (archived Feb. 5, 2017)
(articles 9-12 deal with the rights and obligations of franchisors and franchisees; article
19 deals specifically with the disclosure requirements of franchisors).
269.
See Lee, supra note 95, at 954 (describing China's history of isolationism
since the start of communism).
270.
See id. ("China has continued its commitment to political socialism.").
William Edwards, The Pros and Cons of Franchisingin China, CHINA BUS.
271.
REV. (Jul. 1, 2011), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/the-pros-and-cons-offranchising-in-chinal [https://perma.cc/DT5C-KYQ2] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
272.
Lee, supra note 95, at 956.
273.
Id. at 956-57.
274.
See Cheong, supra note 12, at CHN/1 (citing the positive outlook
corporations have on franchising in China, including McDonald's Corporation's plans to
expand further in Shanghai and Shenzhen).
275.
Edwards, supra note 271.
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franchisees to distribute the franchise out to sub-franchisees.2 7 6 In the
same year, "[t]he China Chain Store and Franchise Association
(CCFA)-a quasi-government nonprofit membership association for
Chinese and foreign retailers, franchisers, and well-known foreign
brands-also formed."27 7 The CCFA now has nine hundred members
with 180,000 outlets across China, and generated annual sales of $300
billion in 2010-the top 120 franchisors alone amassed $52.4 billion.27 8
Thus, the franchise business model has burgeoned into a desirable
business model in China due to the population's increasing affluence
and strong middle-class base. 2 79

Yet, even with the potentially promising opportunities for
franchisors in the Chinese market, they should be cautious of "the lax
licensing regulations, vague laws, and weak intellectual property
protection that could undermine the very identity of a franchise." 28 0
Consequently, foreign franchisors should ensure that they maintain as
much control as possible in their business ownership, intellectual
property, and contractual agreements. 281 But, by ensuring this control
as additional protection against the nebulous nature of Chinese laws,
franchisors are simultaneously opening themselves up to greater risks
of vicarious liability because they maintain maximum control over the
franchisee. 282
Because of China's unique franchising structure, it is crucial to
first understand and appreciate the types of franchises recognized
under the Chinese Franchise Measures. 283 Under Article 5 of the 1997
Franchise Measures, a franchise could be either a direct franchise or a
sub-franchise. 284 Direct franchising is established through a
contractual relationship in which a franchisor directly grants franchise
rights to a candidate but does not grant the right to sub-franchise those
rights. 285 In direct franchising, the franchisor directly gives the
franchisee the right to operate individual or multiple franchise units
in a specific location or area; this has proven successful for several
foreign franchisors. 286 For the other, "indirect" type of franchising, a
sub-franchise operates under a master franchising agreement-an

276.
Lee, supra note 95, at 957.
277.
Edwards, supranote 271.
278.
Id.
279.
Lee, supra note 95, at 951-52.
280.
Id. at 952-53.
281.
Id. at 953.
282.
See Master Franchise Guide (2007), supra note 112, at 172 ("Excessive
control over the sub-franchisee could result in the franchisor and sub-franchisor being
exposed to liability for the acts or omissions of the sub-franchisee.").
283.
See Lee, supra note 95.
284.
Bryan W. Blades, Franchising in China: A Current Perspective, 14
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 20, 22 (2005).
285.
Id. (emphasis added).
286.
See Lee, supra note 95, at 957 (listing Kodak as an example of a franchisor
who has successfully utilized direct franchising).
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agreement that grants a franchisee "the exclusive rights to operate
franchise outlets in a designated territory along with the right to then
sub-franchise those rights to other parties within that territory."2 8 7
These Franchise Measures have attracted great interest from
commentators in common law jurisdictions, as they provide a unique
illustration of franchising law in a civil law country. 288
The Franchise Measures have proven most interesting in regards
to the potential vicarious liability for franchisors in China because they
require a franchisor to guarantee the quality of the products sold by its
designated suppliers.28 9 The Chinese government hopes to protect
consumers by holding the franchisor liable for the products sourced
from outside suppliers. 29 0 This is consistent with the practice of other
civil law countries, focusing on the reasonable expectations of
consumers when determining the vicarious liability of franchisors. 291
Even with these seemingly straightforward protections, however, there
is scant discussion of franchisor vicarious liability under the Franchise
Measures-these measures instead serve mainly as an industry
guideline promoting franchise business.29 2
Because of the rapidly developing economic and social conditions,
compounded by the rampant fraud in domestic franchising activities in
China, the Chinese State Council enacted a law in 2007 that more
directly addresses the rights and obligations of the parties in
franchising: the Regulations on Administration of Commercial
Franchise Regulations (Franchise Regulations). 293 The Franchise
Regulations apply to commercial franchises, which essentially consist
of three elements: (1) the franchisor licenses to the franchisee
"operational resources," (2) the franchisee operates under a unified
business format, and (3) the franchisee pays the franchisor a franchise
fee. 29 4 "Unlike the [Franchise] Measures, the [Franchise] Regulations
do not explicitly address master franchise relationships and the
subfranchising activities conducted thereunder." 295

287.
Blades, supra note 284, at 22-23.
288.
See Paul Jones, The Regulation of Franchising in China and the
Development of a Civil Law Legal System, 2 CHINESE L. & POL'Y REV. 78 (2006)
(discussing the differences between franchising law in common law and civil law
jurisdictions, using China as an example).
289.
Erik B. Wulff & Tao Xu, FranchiseRegulation in China, 25 FRANCHISE L.J.
19, 21 (2006).
290.
Id.
See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 11-17 (discussing the policies of
291.
other civil law countries).
Zhiqiong June Wang & Andrew L. Terry, The Impact of China's Regulatory
292.
Regime on Foreign Franchisors'Entryand Expansion Strategies, 7 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1,
7-8 (2011).
293.
Id. at 10; see Paul Jones & Erik Wulff, FranchiseRegulation in China: Law,
Regulations, and Guidelines, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 57 (2007) (discussing the applicability
of the regulations).
294.
Jones & Wulff, supranote 293, at 58.
295.
Id.
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The Franchise Regulations also require that a franchisor "shall
have a mature business model ... [and] shall own at least two directly
operated company owned outlets for more than one year." 296 Courts
have applied the latter requirement-dubbed the 2+1 ruleinconsistently, and questions abound as to whether it is only an
administrative provision or whether it is a substantive requirement. 29 7
While the Franchise Regulations made significant changes to the
registration and disclosure of franchisors, the focus of this discussion
is on their relationship and conduct modifications.
The regulations integrate the mantra that "persons engaged in
franchising must follow the principles of voluntariness, fairness,
honesty, and good faith," listing the basic rights and obligations of both
franchisors and franchisees. 298 The franchisor is required to furnish a
"franchise operations manual to the franchisee, and provide continuing
operational guidance, technical support, business training, and other
services to the franchisee in accordance with the franchise
agreement."2 9 9 The Franchise Regulations depart from the Franchise
Measures by removing the much criticized provision that made the
franchisor and franchisee jointly and severally liable for the quality of
designated supplier products and services.30 0
In China, however, these are all contract law principles.3 0 1 So,
rather than impose liability on franchisors through agency law,
liability is imposed through the principles of Chinese contract law. 302
Apparent authority derives from agency concerns and third-party
rights that are distinct from the franchising contract.3 0 3 And the
franchisor's potential liability to franchisee customers seems to be
reasonable and in line with Chinese traditions, such as that of
protecting injured parties and punishing those businesses that are
profitable as a result of a direct or indirect connection to improper
conduct linked to consumer injuries (e.g., selling defective goods or
furnishing faulty services). 304

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Wang & Terry, supranote 292, at 14 (alteration in original).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.

301.

Id.; see also MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,

CONTRACT LAW art. 111 (2003) (imposing liability on a company that injures a party due
to breach of contract).
302.
See id. ("If the quality fails to meet the agreed requirements, liability for
breach of contract shall be borne in accordance with the agreement between the
parties.").
Wang & Terry, supra note 292, at 20.
303.
304.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

CHINA arts. 122-26 (1987), http://www.npe.gov.cnlenglishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content
1383941.htm [https://perma.cc/BJ8V-VPCG] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) (dealing with
liability to companies for the injuries of third parties).
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6. Australia and New Zealand
In stark contrast to the aforementioned civil law countries, which
place a greater focus on consumers' reasonable expectations when
determining vicarious liability, common law countries, including
Australia, place a greater emphasis on the extent to which the
franchisor controls the franchisee.3 05 In Australia, the general
proposition is that a principal is usually responsible for all acts within
its agent's actual or apparent authority; in deciding whether an act was
within the scope of an agent's authority, the amount of control is the
essential factor. 306 In Australia, "the doctrine of vicarious liability aims
to produce fair and just outcomes and comfortably sits beside a 'regime
30 7
that imposes liability for fault."'
Despite Australia's relative progress in the application of
vicarious liability in the agency context, the doctrine of vicarious
liability continues to be restricted in application to solely employeremployee relationships-it does not apply to independent contractor
relationships.3 0 8 But, Australian courts have begun to move away from
a rigid "control" test and have adopted a multi-factor test to determine
whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor-the
"totality of the relationship test."3 09 Even with this move away from
the bright-line control test, however, courts still place the greatest
weight on control in determining whether a person is an employee or
not when applying the totality of the relationship test. 31 0 In
determining the right of and level of control exercised, courts consider
such factors as "stipulating hours that may be worked, whether a
uniform or a particular style of clothing is required, workplace rules,
detailed instructions relating to the work itself and how it is to be
carried out, and quality control procedures."3 11
This approach can be contrasted with that used in England, which
also requires that the franchisee be an employee of the franchisor in
order to hold the franchisor vicariously liable, but only finds an

305.
See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 26 (discussing the distinction in
the context of civil law and common law countries).
306.
Id. at 6.
307.
Andrew Terry & Joseph Huan, The Vicarious Liability of Franchisors in
Australia, Presented at the 26th Annual International Society of Franchising Conference
7 (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., May 17, 2012) (quoting Jason Neyers, A Theory of Vicarious
Liability 43 ALBERTA L. REV. 287, 289 (2005)).
308.
Id. at 8.
See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 6. This is in congruence with other
309.
common law countries such as Canada. The traditional Canadian test, known as the
"control test," states that an individual will be considered to be an employee for vicarious
liability where the employer not only tells the person what to do, but how to do it. Id. at
9. Yet, just as Australia has adopted a multi-factor test, Canada has embraced the
"entrepreneurship test" which suggests that, besides control, other factors may
determine the difference between employees and independent contractors. Id. at 9-10.
310.
Id. at 6.
311.
Terry & Huan, supra note 307, at 9-10.
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employment relationship when the franchisee is receiving wage
compensation from the franchisor. 312 Finding vicarious liability under
such a narrow view is extremely unlikely under most franchise
arrangements, where the franchisee earns, or at least tries to earn,
profits from owning and running a business, not from a paycheck from
the franchisor.3 13
In Australia, vicarious liability will apply in the franchising
context when the franchisor and franchisee are in an employeremployee relationship. 3 14 This determination requires courts to
examine all circumstances of the relationship in totality.315 Yet many
scholars have been critical of the multi-factor totality of the
relationship test, as it is subjective and difficult to predict the number
or combination of factors required to establish that a worker is an
employee, particularly considering how greatly outcomes vary on a
case-by-case basis. 316 From the franchisor's perspective, this type of
test gives the franchisor less certainty that its level of control will not

312.

John Pratt, England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, supra

note 12, at ENG/1, ENG/26-27 (relying upon standards announced in Ready Mixed
Concrete v. Minister of Pensions & Nat'1 Ins., (1968) 1 All Eng. Rep. 433 (Eng.)) (holding
that a contract of service exists - thus, whether the person is an employee/agent - if (1)
the contract is consistent with the characteristics of a contract of service, (2) for wage
compensations, a servant agrees to provide work or a skill performing a service for the
master, and (3) performance of that service is subject to the master's control).
313.

See

ROBERT

ROSENBERG

&

MADELON

BEDELL,

PROFITS

FROM

FRANCHISING (1969) (Franchisinghas long been defined as constituting, inter alia, a
method for distributing branded goods or services through independent businesses
(franchisees), with the franchisor continually supplying to each franchisee both knowhow and brand identification and with these fees-paying and royalties-paying
franchisees each "enjoy[ing] the right to profit and run[ning] the risk of loss.") (emphasis
added). Federal disclosure requirements, met by following a format prescribed by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the federal rule entitled "Disclosure Requirements
and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures"
(promulgated in 1979 and amended in 2007), requires a disclosure about actual or
potential profits or losses if a franchisor makes "financial performance representations."
16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s) (2009). Indeed, the fight over the franchisor's statements about a
prospective franchisee's profits was at the heart of the battle over what a franchisor
should have to disclose to potential franchisees. Stuart Hershman & Joyce G. Mazero,
Historical Development of Earnings Claims (Now Financial Performance
Representations)Regulations, in FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE REPRESENTATIONS: THE NEW

AND UPDATED EARNINGS CLAIMS 1, 11-29 (Stuart Hershman & Joyce Mazero eds., 2008)
(on the history of the longstanding push for and ultimate denial of mandatory earnings
claim disclosures). Regardless of the legal framework, the franchisee's most basic
objective is "individual profit-maximization (that is, net revenues)." Robert W. Emerson,
Franchisesas Moral Rights, 14 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 540, 576 (2014);
see also Robert W. Emerson, The Neutral Factfinder as a Pathway to Legal Reform:
Examples from Franchising, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 63 (2015) (detailing, throughout the
article, numerous examples of lost profits claims brought by franchisees).
Terry & Huan, supra note 307, at 11. Alternatively, the parties could be in
314.
an agency relationship, or both might be present (agency and employment).
315.
Id.
316.
See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 7 (discussing the advantages of
the "economic reality test" over the multi-factor totality of the relationship test).
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amount to an employment relationship in a court's eyes. As a result,
the High Court in Hollis v. Vabu Pty. Ltd.3 1 7 adopted the "economic
reality test," where, instead of considering the degree to which an
employer may be said to have the right to control an employee, the
court considers the extent to which a worker may genuinely be said to
be in business on his or her own. 3 1 8 Thus, when someone is deemed an
independent contractor, the court will examine whether, in the course
of bargaining between the two parties, there was a genuine "trade-off'
of advantages. 3 19 Ultimately, scholars have found that this economic
reality test is a more appropriate test against which to measure the
franchising relationship. 320
Also of marked importance in the context of franchising is the fact
that Australian common law only recognizes individuals as
employees. 32 1 Thus, there is an assumption in the Australian courts
that a company cannot be an employee, even if a person is a sole owner
and shareholder of the company-neither a corporate body nor a
partnership will be recognized as an employee. 322 Again, this
classification can be compared to that used in England, which does find
a franchisor vicariously liable if the franchisee is an employee, or is an
agent or partner.3 2 3 In Australia, it is only that smaller franchise
owned and operated by a sole proprietor that may be classified as an
employee. 324
Because of the real challenges Australian plaintiffs face in
bringing vicarious liability actions against franchisors based upon an
employer-employee relationship, the majority of cases move forward
with agency as the basis for franchisor liability. 325 Under Australian
law, in order to establish an agency relationship between a franchisor
and franchisee, plaintiffs must prove the presence of two elements: "the
consent of both the principal and the agent, whether express or implied
to the agency relationship; and authority given to the agent by the
principal to act on the principal's behalf." 326 It is important to note that

317.
318.
319.

Hollis v. Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 181 CLR 263 (Austl.).
Id. at 39-45.
Id. at 58.

320.

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 7.

321.
See id. at 6 (explaining that corporations and partnerships are not
recognized as employees).
322.
See id.; Terry & Huan, supra note 307, at 12.
323.
Pratt, supra note 312, at ENG/26; see also Natalia Lewis, Franchisee or
Employee and Vicarious Liability of Franchisors- the UK Perspective, 2013 Annual
Meeting of the International Distribution Institute (Munich, Germany) (June 15, 2013)
at 5, http://www.idiproject.com:8000/medialmaterials/23-Paper--Lewis.pdf [https://
perma.ccl2BZS-7ASJ] (archived Jan. 23, 2017) ("Since ... a franchisee/franchisor
relationship is unlikely to be considered sufficiently close in character to an
employerlemployee relationship, vicarious liability [in England] is most unlikely to
arise.").
Terry & Huan, supranote 307, at 12.
324.
Id. at 13.
325.
326.

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 7.
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control over an agent's actions is far less decisive in Australia, and thus
less likely to be the sole determinant in establishing an agency
relationship than it is in the United States. 327 Instead, the Australian
position dictates that an agent is one who has authority to act for
another.3 28 Despite favoring the authority test over the control test
(similarly to the United States), franchisors in Australia can be held
liable under both actual agency-established by a conferral of
authority-or apparent agency when the principal held out to a third
party that a particular agent had authority.3 29
Liability under actual agency is best understood as a "creature of
contract," formed by a conferral of authority by the principal to the
agent to act on the principal's behalf.3 3 0 The main thrust of the

Australian agency relationship is to allow the principal to be
represented by the agent, and, concurrently, to create legal relations
with third parties.3 31 In the franchising context, the franchisor's
liability is derived from the franchisor having authorized the
franchisee to act on its behalf, and not from the inherent control that
the franchisor exercises over the franchisee.3 32 Ultimately, if the
franchisee acts as an agent of the franchisor and within the scope of its
authority, and the franchisor controls the channels of business, then
the franchisor is vicariously liable for the franchisee's conduct by way
of actual agency.33 3 In order to mitigate the risk of this potential
liability, the franchisor should deny agency in the franchise agreement
and ensure that the franchisee identifies itself as an independent
business. 334
More central to this discussion is the theory of apparent agency.
In order to establish apparent agency in Australia, the plaintiff must
(1) establish that the franchisor has represented or "held out" the
franchisee as possessing authority, (2) reasonably rely on the
representation, and (3) suffer a detriment as a result of the
representation.3 35 While a franchise agreement may explicitly reject
an agency relationship, this does not technically preclude a finding of
apparent authority, but, there is limited case law on apparent agency
in the franchising context. 336 In an early case on franchisor liability

Id.
327.
328.
Terry & Huan, supranote 307, at 13 (emphasis added).
Id.
329.
Id. at 14.
330.
Id.
331.
332.
See id. (contrasting the difference between the U.S. control test and the
Australian authority test for actual agency liability).
333.
See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supranote 15, at 25 (noting that in Australia control
without actual authority is unlikely to satisfy the theory of actual agency in order to hold
the franchisor liable for the acts of its franchisee).
Id.
334.
335.
Terry & Huan, supranote 307, at 15.
336.
Id. This dearth of Australian case law stands in stark contrast to the U.S.
law, which regularly handles apparent authority cases involving franchisors,
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under apparent agency arising in Australia's sister state of New
Zealand,33 7 Fitzgeraldv. H & R Block,3 38 the New Zealand High Court
held that, although the franchise agreement explicitly stated that
there was no agency relationship between the parties, the plaintiff
sought to establish that the authority bestowed upon the franchisee to
trade under the name "H & R Block" amounted to the "holding out" of
authority for the franchisee to function as the franchisor's agent.3 39
The merits of this argument were not addressed, however, as the court
ultimately held that, because the franchisee had used his own
corporate letterhead, the plaintiff knew that his dealings were with the
franchisee and not with the franchisor; thus, the franchisor was not
vicariously liable through apparent agency for the acts of its
franchisee. 340
In response to the great difficulty plaintiffs face in establishing
apparent agency, a possible new category of franchisor vicarious
liability has surfaced in Australia: the "representative agent test." 34 1
This intermediate category of representative agent does not fit within
either employee or independent contractor standing, but instead falls
somewhere between the two and leaves the franchisor subject to

franchisees, and third party plaintiffs. To provide a sense of how deep such case law is,
the author in March 2016 conducted a Lexis search of federal appeals court cases and
state supreme court cases (franchis! /50 "apparent authority" or "apparent agency" or
"apparent agent" or "agent by estoppel" or "agency by estoppel"), which found, from 1978
to the present, opinions on their merits about a franchisee's apparent authority to act for
the franchisor in six of the federal circuits and in eight different state supreme courts.
Of course, these high-level cases no doubt are just the tip of the iceberg. The vast majority
of federal cases do not reach the level of reported appeals court cases, and very few state
cases become state supreme court opinions.
337.
Australia and New Zealand share a common law heritage and have strong
commercial and legal ties. In franchising, for example, New Zealand simply had a
chapter in the Australian-based Franchise Association of Australia & New Zealand until
1996, when the Franchise Association of New Zealand was formed. Our History,
FRANCHISE

Ass'N

OF

NEW

ZEALAND,

(http://www.franchiseassociation.org.nzlour-

history.html) (last visited Jan. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9AU3-G4LA] (archived Jan.
23, 2017); see Owen Wright & Andrew McAuley, Australian FranchisingResearch:
Review, Synthesis and FutureResearch Directions, 20 AUSTRALASIAN MARKETING J. 158,

&

158-59 (2011) (noting the formation of the Franchisors Association of Australia in 1981
and that in 1993 this association extended membership to include franchisees and was
renamed the Franchise Association of Australia and New Zealand (FAANZ); after New
Zealand formed its own association, FAANZ became known as the Franchise Council of
Australia in 19 in 1998).
This is an unpublished judgment from June 1990 noted in, among other
338.
sources, Steward Germann, New Zealand- Termination of MasterFranchiseAgreements
and the Consequences, 5 J. INT'L FRANCHISING & DISTRIB. L. 37. (2007); Michael Raine
Belinda Atkinson, Franchisor Liability for Franchisee Misconduct, FRANCHISING
UPDATE, n.7 and accompanying text (June 2007), http://www.dibbsbarker.com/publication/
FranchisingUpdate June_2007.aspx [https://perma.ccl2E5E-BS37] (archived Jan. 23,
2017).
339.
Id.
340.
341.

Id..
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 8.
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vicarious liability. 342 Under this minority approach, vicarious liability
can be found where an independent contractor is a representative,
meaning that it executes the franchisor's functions and furthers its
economic interests, effectively as part of its enterprise. 34 3 Thus, if a
franchisee is furnished with the authority to act as the franchisor's
representative, the franchisor should be liable for its franchisee's
negligence to contractors acting within the scope of that authority. 344
If this minority view were adopted more broadly, the application of
vicarious liability in Australia would balloon and likely encapsulate
many more franchisor-franchisee relationships. 345 However, this is not
the current law in Australia, as the majority of courts have held
steadfast in the application of the traditional multi-factor, totality of
346
the relationship test.

IV. CONCLUSION

International franchise law remains unsettled. The rapid growth
of franchising worldwide, 34 7 particularly in legally distinct but
economically integrated regions, such as North America (with federal
nations such as Canada and the United States) or Europe (with the
quasi-federal structure under the European Union), has created an
international need for streamlined, predictable and understandable
franchising law over various jurisdictions. This challenge has been met
with international principles and agreements that provide a better
understanding of international franchising standards, as well as a
model with which to clarify and reconcile different domestic
approaches to franchising and liability. 348
For example, Rome I offers a method for regulating civil and
commercial obligations when there is a conflict of laws in the franchise
context. 349 Similarly, the UNIDROIT Guide and its amendments
provide clarity as to when an agency relationship is formed between a
franchisor and franchisee,35 0 how a franchisor may limit vicarious
liability and seek indemnity from franchisees for torts,3 51 and why
franchisors should have liability insurance and require their subfranchisors and franchisees to do the same. 352 In addition, the Guide
discusses the implementation of franchise-specific legislation to

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
practices).
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Terry & Huan, supra note 307, at 18.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supranote 15, at 8.
Id.
Terry & Huan, supra note 307, at 20.
Id.
See supra notes 1-8 (detailing the increased prevalence of franchising
See supranotes 60, 77, 110, 111 and accompanying text.
Rome I, supra note 78, at art. 1.
Master Franchise Guide (2007), supranote 112, at 170.
Id. at 171, 173.
Id. at 175.
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streamline franchise law.353 An example of this type of legislation is
the Block Exemption Regulation on Vertical Restraints. 354 Legislation
such as this and others will continue to impact how franchises operate
in Europe and provide a model for our domestic franchise laws.
Yet, even with Rome I and the UNIDROIT Guide, it is readily
apparent that different states have divergent approaches to
franchising standards. At one end of the spectrum, civil law countries
such as France, Italy, and Germany focus more on the reasonable
expectations of consumers when determining the vicarious liability of
franchisors.3 5 5 At the other end, common law countries, including the
United States and Australia, concentrate more on the extent of the
control a franchisor has over its agent franchisee when deciding the
extent of a franchisor's vicarious liability.3 5 6 An in-depth analysis of

each of these civil and common law countries reveals that, whether the
focus is on consumer expectations or the level of control, the area of law
concerning franchisor's vicarious liability is both complex and
unsettlingly diverse.
Through this analysis of different countries' laws the Article also
brings the newer, emerging approaches of franchise liability to the
attention of international franchise law scholars. One of these
innovative developments is the representative agent concept
sometimes followed in Australia, where a franchisor may be liable for
the negligence of its franchisee so long as the franchisee acted within
the scope of franchisor-granted authority. 357 This concept has the effect
of making the franchisor a guarantor for any tort liability debt that the
franchisee incurs to a third party.35 8 If the franchisee does not have the
assets to pay a tort judgment against it, the franchisor-as-guarantor
acts as a surety and "picks up the bill" for the franchisee. Yet, beyond
tort liability debt, the franchisor would not be liable unless the typical
forms of actual or apparent agency are present.35 9
Implementing this representative agent model in the United
States may result in increased legal vulnerability for franchisors, but
such exposure can easily be curbed if the franchisor establishes a
distinction between itself and the franchisee. To ensure this
separation, a franchisor would want to distinguish itself by notifying
customers, suppliers, and other third parties of its independent

353.
See id. at 281 (listing legislative techniques to increase franchisorfranchisee disclosure to develop franchise law).
Id. at 303-04.
354.
355.

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 26.

356.
See id. at 9 (identifying the importance of control in Common Law regimes).
Id. at 8.
357.
358.
See id. ("If [this practice] were to prevail, the risk to franchisors of vicarious
liability for the acts of their franchisees in Australia would increase significantly").
Id.
359.
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status. 360 This would serve as a protection for the franchisor, because,
without justifiable reliance on the appearance of agency, a third party
would not be able to sue the franchisor directly or obtain a judgment
against the franchisor.
Protection could also be implemented in the form of a mandated
warning, 361 which franchisees would have to make to any third parties
with whom they interact; this is similar to the law in France that
requires notice to franchise customers about the true owner of the
enterprise from which they are purchasing a good or service. 362 Under
this regime, misplaced reliance on an apparent agency would no longer
be justified. 363 Indeed, in website business, marketing best practices
call for elaborate upfront declarations of information. 364 Thus, every
franchised outlet should have to post the name of that outlet's owner
prominently, on all major business communications, including
advertisements, websites, storefront signs, and contractual documents.
At the very least, these communications should indicate that a
particular franchised business is not the same as the franchisor itself.
Examples might include the following: P & D's Subway®; Suburban
Valley LLC Hampton Inn; and Anytime Fitness of North Florida,
Independent Proprietors. 365

See BEYER, supra note 22, at 8 ('in the absence of any notice (or sufficient
360.
notice) to the public that the franchisee outlet is independently operated, the risk of
apparent agency is heightened"). Such a franchisor still might be a surety under the
representative agent concept, despite efforts to limit liability. This point is discussed
supra notes 339-44, 355-57 and accompanying text.
361.
The warning should be a requirement that franchisees must meet and that
franchisors could be expected to monitor as a matter of self-interest. Such requirements
are already standard fare for local governments needing to be able to have contact
information for property owners of leased business premises. See CITY OF ST.
PETERSBURG

CODES

COMPLIANCE

ASSISTANCE

DEPT.,

LEGAL

PREMISES

AGENT

DESIGNATION FORM, http://www.stpete.org/codes/docs/LEGALPREMISESAGENT_
DESIGNATION-FORM.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6EHA-8TZW]
(archived Jan. 22, 2017) (a form St. Petersburg, Florida meant "to ensure that a
responsible person can be readily contacted about the condition of a building, the City
Code Chapter 8, Section 8-99 requires that all owners of non-owner occupied buildings
within the City appoint and designate an individual").
362.
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 14; see supra notes 225-29 and
accompanying text.
363.
Indeed, as the leading commentator on French franchise and distribution
law has opined, apparent authority in the franchising context simply is not a serious
issue in French law, courtesy of the Neiertz Decree notice (supra notes 225-229 and
accompanying text). Interview with Didier Ferrier, Prof. of Law (emeritus), Univ. of
Montpellier (Fr.), in Montpellier, France (June 5, 2014).
business on Google, GOOGLE
Guidelines for representing my
364.
https://support.google.comlbusiness/answer/3038177?hl=en (last visited Jan. 22, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/6EJU-K2R7] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
365.
See Emerson, supra note 231, at 669 (giving similar examples of franchisee
business names that inform others of the business' independent ownership and
operations, which in turn should "render the franchisor-who ought to be directly
named-not liable for the acts or omissions of the franchisee.")
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To ensure that these warnings are effective, franchisors would
have a statutory duty to monitor their design and display. As a matter
of fairness, and to ensure that the franchisor oversees these matters
thoroughly, the franchisor's supervisory obligation would not create or
even implicate franchisor vicarious liability; any liability would stem
solely from direct, franchisor responsibility for a franchisee's actions or
inaction. In other words, franchisor actions (whether too much or too
little) that fail to notify effectively the franchisee customers about the
true business ownership could only lead to statutory liability for these
franchisor failures and any provable, direct consequences thereof. 36 6

In addition, if the business ownership notification requirement
included a high statutory damages provision, this should have the
salutary effect of coercing obedience from franchise systems. The law
would speak to the sophisticated parties (franchisors) for whom
compliance would be essentially a one-time decision to adopt policies
and controls. 367 With a statute or regulation announcing that
violations are serious and subject to cumulative, aggregated charges
(e.g., daily penalties per customer in a possible class action suit),
compliance should become an easy decision for franchisors. That is, it
should incentivize the adoption of policies and controls which are easy
to implement system-wide to avoid not just vicarious liability actions
but, more immediately, statutory penalties. 368 Vicarious liability has
been implemented for other business relationships and franchising
contexts. In the Australian state of Victoria, liability is imposed on the
principal in a real estate relationship (the franchisor) when its agent
(the franchisee) acts negligently or commits fraud. 369 Likewise, in
Israel, the court followed a similar agency approach for a case where
property holders sued a real estate franchisor and its franchisee
realtor. The Israeli court undoubtedly would have found franchisor
liability for franchisee negligence or fraud. However, agency theory did
not warrant liability because the franchisor was never informed about

366.
Monitoring receipts or other communications from a franchised enterprise
to its customers has been considered in light of a federal statute. A restaurant customer
brought a vicarious liability claim against franchisor Denny's due to the franchisee's
failure to comply with the credit or debit card receipt duties of the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 168(c) (2006) (FACTA), In its provisions
mandating the truncating of electronically generated credit card numbers on receipts,
FACTA provides that "no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the
transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the
expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or
transaction." 15 U.S.C. § 1681(c)(g)(1) (2006). See also Patterson v. Denny's Corp., No.
07-1161, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6747, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008) (the court denied
Denny's motion to dismiss on the grounds that if the franchisor controls the software for
printing receipts in franchisee stores, then franchisor could be liable for a FACTA
violation).
367.
Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELLL. REV. 753, 782-85 (2012).
368.
See id. at 783-84 (discussing the severity of statutory sanctions, such as
those in the Right to Financial Privacy Act).
Interview with Andrew Terry, supra note 96.
369.
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the details of its franchisee's work, and thus the franchisor could not
have known about any negligence or intentional wrongdoing.3 70
Finally, the liability can extend to other activities: for example, under
Spanish law, franchisors can be held liable when the advertising of
their products leads the consumer to believe they are the enterprise
'

37
the consumer is dealing with.

The expansion of these approaches to the franchising context,
through the representative agent approach or something similar,
would expand liability for franchisors and protect consumers in a
broader way than existing agency principles. This is especially
important to consider in the tort liability context (e.g., for defective
products), where a tort victim may be unsuccessful in recovering from
an insolvent franchisee.3 72 Still, where the franchisee is insolvent, a
plaintiff will have to prove traditional actual or apparent agency in
order for the franchisor to be held vicariously liable.37 3
Some countries have already circumvented this tort concern as
well. In Lithuania, when end-users buy goods from a franchisee, their
products liability suits may hold the franchisor liable for defective
(unsafe) products, for otherwise poorly made products, or for inferior
servicing of products; the franchise agreement cannot insulate the
franchisor from this franchisor-franchisee joint liability. 374 Similarly,
in Portugal, a franchisor can be held liable when a consumer suffers
injury "from a product defect or a misconception of know-how"
regarding the brand.37 5 Perhaps most broadly, Malaysian courts have
held the franchisor vicariously liable when the franchisee is using the
6
franchisor's trademark.37
As demonstrated earlier in this Article, in the context of German
law, the focus is no longer on whether the franchisor instructs a
franchisee how to do this job, but is on the possibility that the

&

See Peggy Sharon & Inbal Natan-Zehavi, Israel, in INTERNATIONAL
370.
FRANCHISING, supra note 12, at ISR/1, ISR/7 (citing Guy Ovadia v. Anglo Saxon
Others, No. 2313/03, 2007 CA (CA 31 July 2007). In Guy Ovadia, the franchisee realtor
acted negligently toward her clients (the plaintiffs) by never posting "for sale signs" and
selling the clients' property for $165,000 when their requested price was about $240,000).
The Israeli Magistrate Court held that the brokerage agency (the franchisor) was not
liable to the franchisee's clients, under any agency theory (presumably, an actual
authority claim) because (1) the franchise agreement placed liability for damages on the
franchisee, and (2) the franchisor never knew about the details of the franchisee's work
for the plaintiffs (her negligence toward the plaintiffs). Id.
371.
372.
373.

RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 14.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. e (1998).
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 14.

374.

Paulius Markovas & Rita Kambleviciene, Lithuania, in INTERNATIONAL

FRANCHISING, supra note 12, at LIT/1, LIT/15 (citing Article 6.773(i)-(2) of Lithuania's

Civil Code).
Magda Mendonga Fernandes, M6nica Pinto Candeias & Filipa Correia da
375.
Silva, Portugal,in INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING, supra note 12, at POR/1, POR/9.

376.

Baskaran, supra note 183, at MAY/12.
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franchisor is able to control the franchisee's actions.37 7 This focus has
shifted because of the broad umbrella of apparent agency, which
usually views the franchise relationship from the viewpoint of the
consumer, similar to the "agent representative" approach. Both
approaches support the extension and expansion of possible franchisor
liability from the public policy rationale that consumers have a right
to expect that control has been or is exercised if the franchisor could
exercise that control. By establishing a franchise system, a franchisor
can easily be hauled into court or be expected to pay a judgment
through the doctrine of apparent agency, which leaves a lot of guessing
as to whether liability will be found after evaluating the facts and
circumstances. The representative agent approach would differ in that
the franchisor could always plan ahead and build a reserve in the event
of tort liability incurred by the franchisee.
Divergent franchising standards exist and are likely to endure
between states in the United States, thus domestic legislators would
be well served to examine these international franchising approaches
and clarify and reconcile the nation's various approaches-regulatory
and judicial-to franchising liability. While the likelihood of
international fluidity in franchise laws is remote, continuity in
franchise laws across the United States is not impossible. Uniform
laws have been established in other areas of law (e.g., contract law)
and can serve as an example for uniform franchise laws. In observing
international franchising approaches, legislators will ensure that
franchise law will not vary so widely across domestic jurisdictions. The
result of disputes will be more predictable, and franchisors, as well as
franchisees, will benefit from a better understanding of the legal
consequences of their decisions.

377.

GELIKER, supra note 209, at 66-67.

